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FOREWORD
1. By General Assembly resolution 2162 A (XX I ) of 5 December
1966, the Secretary-General was requested to prepare, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, a report on the effects of the
possible usc of nuclear weapons and all the security and economic implications for S t:lIes of the acquisition and further development of these
weapons.
2. In pursuance of this resolution, I appointed a group of consultant experts whose members were: \Vilhelm Billig. Chairman of the
State Council for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, P oland; Alfonso
Leon de Garay, Director of the Genetics and Radiobiology Programme,
National Nuclear Energy Commission, Mexico; Vasily S. EmciY3nov.
Chairman of the COlllmission on the Scientific Problems of Disarmament
of the Academy of Sciences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Martin Fehrm, Director General of the Research Institute of Swedish
National Defence; Bertrand Goldschmidt, Director of External Relation;;
and Planning, Atomic Energy Commission, France; \V. Bennett Lewis,
Senior Vice-President, Science, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited:
Takashi :MukaillO, Professor, Faculty of Engineering, University of
Tokyo, Japan; H. ~1. A. Onitiri, Director, Nigerian Institute of Social
and Economic Research, University of Tbadan. N igeria; John G. Palfrey,
Professor of Law, Columbia University, New York, United States of
Ame rica; Gunnar Randers, ~lallaging Director, Xorwegian In sti tute for
Atomic Energy; Vikralll A. Sarabhai, Chairlllan, Atomic Ene rgy Commission of India; Sir Solly Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Adviser to lkr
Majesty's GO\'Crnlilent, United Kingdom. Mr. i\o[ullath A. Vellocli.
Deputy to the Under-Secretary, Department of Political and Security
Council Affairs, servc'(\ as Chairman. He was assisted by me11lLers of
the Secretariat.
3. The consultant experts, in their personal capacities, have ~ub
mined to me a report containing their considered and unanimous view~
on the variOllS and complex aspects of the subject matter of this report.
The consultant experts have approachecl their task in the spirit of the
resolution of the General Assembly and it gives me very great satisfaction that they were able through co·operation and understanding to come
up with a unanimous report. \Vhat makes the report particularly valuable is the fact that, in tryi ng to reach unanimity, the expert consultants
have not avoided sensitive or even controversial issues. This is extremely
significant because the value of the report lies in its clear and fair exposition of the problem. I am very pleased to be able to endorse their findings. I wish also to record my most sincere appreciation for their invaluable assistance in carrying out an important and delicate task.
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4, I ha\'c thcrefore decided to transmit thei r report in fu ll to the
General Assembly as the report called for by resolution 2162 A (XX I ),
It is with a sensc of gratification that I submit this report. As I wrote
last year in the introduction to thc annual report on the work of thc
Organization, " T believe that the time has come for an appropri ate body
of the U nited Nations to explore and weigh the impact and implications
of all aspects of nuclear weapons, , , To know the true nature of Ihe
danger we face may be a most important first step towards averting ii",
It is my hope that this report, and the ensuing debate by the General
Assembly, will not only prov ide a deeper and dearer understanding of
the effects of the nuclear arms race but also positively contribute to tht'
"(';Irch for way~ to hring it to an em!.
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U i 'l''I'ER Of' TRANSMIT TA L

6 October 1967
\Ve have the honour to submit herewith a unanimous report on the
effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security anu
e«lllomic implications for States of the acquisition and further develop·
llIent of these weapons which we wefe invited to prepare in purslIano:e
of General Assembly resolution 2162 A (XX I ).
The report was df;tfted du ring meetings held in Geneva between
G and 10 ),Jarch and between 26 June and 5 July 1%7, and finalizl'<.l
at meetings held in :-Jew York between 2 and 6 OClober 1967. Mr. ~1. A.
Vellod i, Deputy to the Under-Secretary, Dcp.ulmel1t of Political 3mI

Security COllneil Affairs of the United Nations Secretarial. served as
Chairman at all the sessions.
The Group of Con::.uitanl Experts wish to express their gratitLIde
for the valuable assistance they received from the members of the
Secretariat.
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I. EFFECrS OF THE POSSIBLE USE
OF NUCLEAII WEAPONS
I NTRODU CTIO N

I. The enormity of the shadow which is cast over mankiud by the
!,o..sibility of Iluclcar war makes it essential that its effects Uc: dearly
and widely understood. It is not enough to know that nuclear weapon:;
add a completely new dimension to man's powers of destruction. Published estimates of the effects of nuclear weapons range all the way from
the concept of the total destruct ion of humanity to the belief that a
nuclea r war would diffe r frOIll a conventional conflict, not in kind, but
only in sca le. The situation, however, is not as <lrbitrary as oppo~i ug
generalizations such as these might sllggeSt. There is one incscap.."Iblc
<I !ld basic fact. It is that the Iluclear ar mour ics \\"hich arc in being already
comain large megaton weapons everyone of which has a dcstructi"e
power greater than that of all the conventional cxplosi\'e that has cver
beell used ill warfare since the day gunpowder was disco\·ered. \\'erc
!iuch weapons ever 10 be used in lIumbers, hundreds of millions of people
might be killed, and civilization ;IS we know it. as well as organized
cOlllLmmity lifc, would ine"itably comc 10 an eud in the countries invoh'cJ
in 1he conflict. l\ lany of those who su r"i"cd the immediate c1eslrtlction,
as wcJl as others in countries out side the area of conflict, wou ld he
exposed to widely-spreading radio-active contamination, and would
suffer from 100lg-term effects of irradiation and transmit, to their offspring, a genetic burden wh ich would become manifest in the liisabilities
of later generations.
2. These general propos itions, whether ~e t out liispassionately in
scient ific studies or directed as propaganda, have been proclaimed so
often that their force has all but been lost through repetition. But their
reality is none the less so stark that, unless the facts on which Ihey are
based are clearly set out, it will nOI be possible to realize the peril in
which mankind now stands.
3. The purpose of the first section of this report is to providc a
picture of the destructive power of nuclear weapons and of the consequences of their use. It gives a brief accou nt of the destruction wrought
in Hi roshima and Nagasaki by the explosion of single and relatively
small nuclear weapons. These two disasters arc the only examples of the
actual use of nuclear weapons in war, and they provide direct infonnation about the kind of casualties caused by nuclear explosions. The first
section also outlines some theoretical studies of the physica l effects of

mw.:h larger nuclear weapons on tent res of pOJlulatioll and on the
civilian economy, as well as the effcct such weapons would have on major
military targets. It deals too with the implications of so-called tactital
nuclear warfare. that is to say of field warfare in which nuclear weapons
are used. To achieve a measure of realism, most of these studies were
related to actual, as opposed to hypothetical geographic,, ] areas, towns
or cities, that is to say cities with a particular pattern of public services.
communications and food supply. In a widespread exchange of strategic
nuclea r weapon s many cities would suffer devastation similar to that of
the examples studied, with a cumulative interacting effect which would
greatly exceed the simple addition of the dircct result s of individual
attacks. Accepti ng that an attacker could always have the advantage over
a defender in terms of surprise and weight of attack, no attempt has been
made to complicate the general story by analysi ng the extent to which an
ABM defence , together with civil defence measures, might reduce the
scale of damage and the number of casualties which would result from a
nuclear attack. It is enough to note that there is no active defence system
in sight which would pre,'ent all nuclear weapons frOlll reaching their
selected targets.
4. Some tedmical details and general characteristics of nuclear
explosions are set out in annex I to this section. The genetic effects of
nuclea r radiation are discussed in annex II .
HIROSHIMA AND NA GASAKI

Physical effects

5. The first atom ic bomb to be used in warfare had a yidd of
nearly twenty kilotons, that is to say it had an explosive force equivalcnt
to nearly 20,CXXI tons of conventional chemical explosive (e.g., TNT ).
It was detonated at approximately 550 metres above Hiroshima on
6 August 1945. On 9 August a second atomic device, with a similar yield,
was detonated at about the same height over Nagasaki. In Hiroshima,
destruction was concentric around the centre of a spreading city whose
population was about 3OO,CXXI. Within seeonds, a rapidly growing fire1>..11 developed into a Illushroom-l ike cloud. supported, as it wcre, 0 11 a
column of black smoke, and the heat radiating frolll the fire-ball caused
thousands of fires.
6. By comparison with Hiroshima, Nagasaki was a narrow city
surrounded by hills and open to the sea in only one direction. with a
population of about 87,000 people living within three kilometres from the
centre. The immediate effects of the explosion were the same, but the
area of destruction and fire differed in accordance with the different
layout of the cities. In both cases the heat of the explosion was so intense
that, up to a distance of about a half kilometre fr OIll the centre of lhe
disaster, the surface of domestic ceramic roof tiles melted and fi ring of
domestic wooden houses, by direct radiation, was observed up to one and
a half kilometres.
2

7. There arc varying estimates of the casualties ' in Hi roshima and
Kagasaki and it has proved difficult to estimate the exact numbers of
exposed people who Illay have died after escaping from the city. Available estimates arc that 78,(X)() were killed and 84,(X)() injured in Hiro~ hil11a, and that 27,(X)() were killed and 41,(X)() injured in Nagasaki. [n
addition . there were thousands missing in both towns. ~Iost of the
immediate fatal casualties wc re c.'l.used by the \'iolent disruption of residential and office buildings. In Hiroshima 6O,(X)() houses were completely
or partially destroyed. Wooden houses within two and a half kilometres
radius were carried away, while brick bltildings were turned into heaps
of rubble. Severe damage to houses occurred as far out as eight
ki lometres. Walls, doors, bricks, glass, furniture and other debris hurtled
through the air, crushing or damaging c\'erything il1 their way. Mode rately close to "ground-zero", by which is meant the point on the ground
directly below the explosion, buildings were pushed O\'er llOdily, and at
grea ter distances were leaning away fr om the source of the blast.
S. No c.'(act information is available concerning the relative importance of blast, burns and nuclear radiation as the causes of fatali ties in
these hombings. Burn injuries constituted the major problem in medical
care. People exposed in the open had been severely burned . injuries from
direct radiation being incu rred as far out as about two kilometres from
the centre of the zone of destruction. From the day after thc bombing,
hu rns accounted fo r about one half of all the deaths. At the Kameyama
Hospital in Hiroshima 53 per cent of the patients who received burns at
011e. kilometre died within the fi rst week and i5 per cent within two
weeks. The peak mortality occurred on the fourth day. Allother peak
in deaths occur red in the third and the fourth week, when complications,
especially those associated with radiation injury, sct in. Twenty days
afte r the attack it was found that. among burned survivors, the great
majority (80-90 per cent) had suffered "flash" burn::. from the immediate
absorption of the thermal radiation of the explo~ioll on the cxposed skin:
SOI11C 5-15 per cent had suffered both Rash and flame burns; a \'cry few
(2-3 per cent) had suffered flame burns only.
9. The explo.!>ion over Hiroshima rapidly led to a fireSlorll1~ which
lasted for about six hOUTS and which burned out an area of twel\'e
~quare kilometres of the 10W I1. \\' ilhin about I WO to three hours a wind,
which started twenty mi nutes after the delonation of the bomb, reached
a velocity of fifty to sixty kilometres per hOl1r, blowing towards thc
burning city [rom a1l directions. Seventy per cent of the fire-fighting
machines in Fire Brigade stations \\'ere rendered unusahle, and 80 per
1 The population and casualty figures referred to arc taken from public :1.1)l1(1Ullccments of local gO~'erlllllen ts in Hiroshima and Ka~asaki. six m011lhs aftcr
lhe ('l{plo~ions, based Oil reports b) the sur.ey mission of the Na tional Rcsearch
Council, Jap;m.
'A fircstorm is not a special characteristic of nuckar eXlllnsiOll. It mal be a
consequence of a fort'st fire or an incendiary bomb attack, with hil!h inward \\inds
Ilroduced largely by the upd raft of tht htated air o\'cr an extensile burlling area.
Tht incidence of firestorll\S is t!tpcnd .. nt 011 conditiOIl~ :1' the time of the attack.
including the loc;11 :ll'ail;Lbi lit) of fud.
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ccnt of the fire-fighting persollnel were unable to respond 10 the emergency. The loss of water pressure through the breaking of pipes, mainly
due to the collapse of buildings, contributed greatly to the additional
destruction by fire. But even if men and machines had survived the blast,
many fires would have beell inaccessible within one and a half kilometres
from ground-zero.
10. About 45,000 uf the fatal caslialties in Hiroshima dic(l 0 11 the
day of the explosion, and some 20,()(X) during the following four months,
as a result of traumatic wounds, burns and radiation effects. T here are
no estimates of the numbers who may have died from the effects of
induced radio-activity experienced during rescue work in the city. Most
of the medical facilities in Hiroshima were in the devastated area of the
city, and the methods adopted for treating casualties were conseq\lently
far below standard. Difficulties were aggravated by shortage of supplies
and equipment, and by the extraordinary demands made on crippled
medical staffs. Next to immediate medical problems, the most serious
cballenge to those who had survived the direct effects of the explosion,
were problems of water supply, housing and food. Electrical distribution
systems suffered severely, first by damage to overhead lines, and secondly
by damage to switch gear and transformers caused by collapse of the
structures in which they were located. To people who were not inl111ediate casualties these difficulties compounded the profound psychological
effects of the disaster of which they were part. E"en twenty yea rs after
the bombings there is an e;-;cessive sensiti" it)' of the people to the thought
of radiation hazard, leading to difficulties in obtainillg agreement about
the siting of nuclear power plants.
Long-term radialio,) cOeds
II. Apart fr0111 the effects which ionizing radiation had on the
immediate victims of the e;-;plosions, the survivors were also e.'<posed to
the hazards of the radiation both in terms of latent disease occurring in
the individual (somatic effeets) and of changes in hereditary material
(genetic effects). It had been suspected for S0111e time that exposure to
repeated moderate doses of nuclear radiation is conducive to leukaemia,
a disease which is associated with a malignant over-production of wh ite
blood cells. A study of the su rvivors of the two nuclear explosions, over
Hirosh ima and Nagasaki, shows that the disease can undoubtedly result
from a large single (acute) dose of radiation. The incidence of leukaemia
in the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was observed 10 be increasing in 1948. It reached a peak in 1950-1952. Although it seems to ha"e
decreased somewhat since then, it still remains much higher than in the
une.'<posed population of the rest of Japan. While the incidence of the
disease increased in all age groups, it did so rather morc sharply in
young people. The incidence in survivors was up to fifty limes greater
in those within about one kilometre of the explosion than in people who
Iyere further away. 11 was ten times greater for those within one and
one and a half kilometres than for those between two and len kilOmetres
from grOlllld-zero.

12. A continu ing study of the su rvivors of the two Jap.1nese (lisasters has also suggested an increased incidence fo r other kinds of malignant cancer, particularly cancer of the thyroid, and not just leukaemia,
which has a much shorter latent interval. There is also a hint, but as yet
no more than a hint, that the average expectation of life is less in the
survivors of the exposed population whether or not they suffered malignant disease. This is an effect of radiation which has been proved in
experimental animals. The indications are stronger that a significantly
high proportion of the babies born to women who were pregnant when
exposed to the explosion, and who survived, had he.1ds smaller than
average size, and Ihat sollle of these suffered severe mental retardation.
13. Insufficient time has passed since these two nuclear dis.1sters
to determine what genetic changes, if any, were induced in the survivors.
[n any case, although long-term genetic effects would indeed be consequences of radiation in nuclear wariare, such effects arc of prime concern
only where the acute effects can be disregarded, i.e., in areas far removed
from the immediate target areas in a nuclear war or under couditions of
intense testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. Hence for the purpose of this report, it has not been tho\lght necessary to discu!>s fully the
present state of knowledge about the genetic effects of ionizing radiation.
Some facts concerning these effects are given in annex II. All that need
be noted here is that radiation from nuclear explosions can cause genetic
mutations and chromosomc anomalies which may 1e.1d to serious physical
and mental disabil ities in future gencrations. These effects may arise
either from the radiation released in the first few in<;tallts after a nuclear
explo!>ion or from that released through the later radio-acti"e decay of
the substances contai ned in "fall-oul" frllm Ihe explosion. In this connexion it should be 1l0ted that there was 110 sign ificant local fall -ou l in
either lliroshima or Nagasaki si llce. in hoth cases, the e:-.;:plosions occurred fairly high in the atlllosphere.
TUE SIGNa'ICANC E OF TilE l'OSSI1II.I<: USE OF NUC I..E,\R
WEAI'ONS IN "'UTURE W,\RS

14. In all wars, advancing armies have sought to capture vital
enemy objecti"es, such as cities, illdu ~tr i al zones and food producing
areas, as well as to command the transport system linking them . Air
warfare has made it possible to attack and destroy such targets without
first defeating the defending armies. The obliteration of the di~tinctioll
between the "front" or the "rear" of a war zone, which came abolll as a
result of the air offensives of the Second ·World \Var, has now been
compounded by the advent of nuclear weapons. Those who defined the
two Japanese targets for the fir:.t and onl)' atomic bombs yet used in war
held that the bombs should he used so as to cre.1te Ihe maximum psychological ellect, and thus break the will of the Japanese people to continue
the fight. Some present-day military theorists who write about nuclear
war speak of attacks 0 11 cities taking place simultaneously with, or even
before. attacks on armed forces and specific military targets.
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15. It is therefore necessary to build up a picture of what would
happen if a large city were attacked not with kiloton weapons of the
kind used on the two Japanese cities but with the much more powerful
hydrogen bombs or fusion bombs which are available now and whose
yield is usually expressed in megatons, i.c., unit yields cquivalent to one
million tons of chemical explosive. Because of the nature of nuclear
weapons all thcir sep..uate destructive effects, whether immcdiate or
delaycd, could never be maximized in a single explosion. For example,
the areas affected by blast, thermal radiation and initial nuclear radiation
would be appreciably smaller for a ground-burst than an air-burst of Ihe
same energy yield. On the other hand, a ground-bu rst would be accompanied by early radio-active fall-out, which would be much less for an
ai r-burst. \Vith air-bursts, the relative importance of the various effects
would depend on the height of the burst.
16. Sincc every city has its own individuality, its own pattern of
services, communications and food supplies, a realistic picture of what
would happen cannot be derived unless one considers a real city, and
analyses the effects zone by zone, taking into account differences between
them in population density, {unction and so on. One such study was
made of a city, with a population of just over olle million people, which
extended in all directions for about cight to ten kilometres (i.e., with a
surface area of some 250 sq. kill. or about 100 sq. miles), and attacked,
it was assumed, with a single one-mc!,'<lton nuclear weapon, burst at
ground level. Using the e.'(perience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and
estimating also on the basis of the results of carefully designed wcapons
effects e.'(periments, the following figures of casualties emerged:
Killed by blast and fire .... . ............................... . . 270,000
Killed by radio-active fall-out .... . .......................... . 90,000
Injured (of whom 15,000 were ill the arca of fall-out and thus
exposed to the effects of radiation) ................. .
90,000
Uninjured (of whom 115,000 were in the area of fall-out) ..... 710,000

17. Approximately one third of all the inhabitants would have been
killed as a result of blast and fire or from a radiation dose received in the
first two days. One third of a million dead is approximately the same
!lumber of civilians who were killed by air raids both in Gennany and in
jap'lIl during the whole of the Second World War. Practically alt the
inhabitants of the central area of the city, an area of about six by five
kilometres, would have been killed. mainly as a result of thc destruction
caused by blast and fire. Any who were not immediately killed in the
central area would have died from nuclear radiation . At the outer
boundary of the central area (hatched area, figure 1) the proportion of
casualties in t he population would fall to 75 per cent, and would then
continue to faU as the distance from the burst increased. Most of the
9O,(X)() of the city's population who would have suffered non-letha l
injuries would have becn serious casualties, and, for 15 to 20 per cent
of these, rescue operations would have been greatly impedcd by radioactive fall -out. I n the part of the population who, in this particular
6

FIGURE 1. CASUALTIES
(within cify boundary)
Distribution 0/ casualtits

B

o

5 km

A i! a line enclosing central area 6 X 5 km where practically the whole population would have been killed
B is a line thr ough a point 2.5 km west of bomb-burst marking limit of fall-out
C marks area inside which a person would ha,'e received a lethal dose from
fall-out in 48 hours if he had stayed in the open

analysis, were not counted as casualties, 20 per cent would have been
subject to radio-active fall-out hazards. Only half of the total population
in the city would have been both uninjured and unaffected by fall-out
(figure II) .
18. The scale of the physical destruction which would be associated
with casualties of this order of magnitude is so great that there is no
basis of experience which could sen'e to help describe the instantaneous
trau sformatiOIl of a vast living city into a sea of blazi ng rubble. Every
house or building would be damaged; about one third would be COIUpletely wrecked, i.e .. with damage ranging from ulter and complete
obliteration, to buildings with more than half their walls down; another
one third would be severely damaged, i.e., wrecked for all practical pur7

FI ','.·U II. EITf.t1" OF II GROUXII-I!II'MST llt:GllTOX 110MB OX TilE
1,160,000 1:-< II IIJIITII NTS

Killed
by blast
and firo
(270,000)

Uninjured
and free
of fall-out

(595,000)

""'",-,, KiUcd by radio·activo
fall-out (90,000)

/j~

. Injured
in fall-out

(15,000)

poses, but perhaps providing some temporary shelter if nothing else were
available. Only about one third of the original houses would be in any
way serviceable, although they would have lost a great p.'lrt of their
roofs, doors and windows (figure 111 ) . In many areas, water and gas
mains, sewers, and power supplies would have been destroyed. Not a
single area would have retained all its essential services (figure IV ) .
Ro..ds would have been erased and c\'en the lightly damaged peripheral
areas would very likely l>c depri,red of their water supplies and sources
of food supply. It is all but impossible to conceive of the amount of
improvisation and reorg:H1ization which would be demanded from the
shocked survi"ors in the period immediately following the attack, even
though every possible plan had been made to deal with the anticipated
results of a possible st rike.
19, Against this background of death, injury, destruction and fire ,
olle c.'ln sec the whole life of a great city being completely disrupted by
the explosion of a single megaton bomb. As an orgunized unit, c.'lpable of
contributing to a war effort, it would cease to have any meaning. The
survh·ors in different parts of the city would either l>c in a state of
shocked immobility or would be wandering about trying to find some
place better than the one where they happened to be when the bomb went
off, searching for food. for better shelter, for relatives. for help of any

8

F1GURl. III. En'ECT OF A GROUN~DURST MEGATON 110MB ON ACCOMMODATION

Usable

Wrecked

-·...."'''-111

Burnt out

kind. The problems confronting the community would be immeasurably
greater than any experience of the Second World War. In hostile circumstances of the kind we are assuming, it would be unrealistic to suppose that only one city would be struck. With many in the same
desperate plight, there could be no question of ally substantial help
being brought to the survivors from outside. In brief, a big city of the
size that hlls been described. a city in which more than a million people
lived in lln area of about 250 sq. km. would for all practical purposes be
eliminated by a single one-megaton weapon ground-burst near its centre.
One-megaton bombs are slllall units in the megaton spect rum ; larger
weapons, much larger ones, are now stockpiled.
Radio-active cotltami,wtioll

20. Close to the explosion the lethal effects of radiation would be
instantaneous. nut nuclear weapon explosions also give rise to radioactive fission products and, in the case of a ground-burst, these become
mixed with earth particles sucked into the atmosphere. The heavier
particles of soil and weapon debris fall back to the ground and settle in
the vicinity of the explosion, giving rise to delayed radiation hazards.
These particles constitute local radio-active fall-out. For a ground-burst
of the type assumed in the foregoing paragraphs. the area of intense
fall-out could cover hundreds of square kilometres. \Vithin stich an area,

9

FleuR!: IV.

SERV I CES DESTROYED

E+B

E+ B+ G+S

E Electricity

B Food stores
Q

5 km

G Gas
S Sewage
W Water

people who were not adequately sheltered and who did not remai n under
cover until the radio-acti\'ity of the fall-Ollt had decayed substantially
would be exposed to intensities of radiation sufficient to produce very
serious hazards to health. Figure V illustrates a fa ll--out pattern in the
amount of nuclear radiation which an individual would recei\'e in rads
per hour for an idealized case of one particular wind speed, in a given
di rection, following a one-megaton explosion at ground level. Beyond
the area of intense fall--oUl there would be a very much larger zone
where sign ifica nt intensi ties of radiation would be e.'(perienced and
where a proportion of the people who were exposed would still be at
ri sk. ( F or significance of irradiation doses, see annex I, table 4.)
21. The pictu re painted in paragraphs 16-19 was derived , as
already observed, from a detailed analysis of an actual city, taking into
accoullt its true layout, and the differential dist ribution of its population.
If, instead, olle assumes the general case of a single megaton explosion at
a height of about 3,000 metres rather than at ground level, over a hypothetical city having a population of one million people who are e\'enly
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dist ributed in a built-up area of twenty by twenty kilometres, the following general conclusions emerge:
(a) W ithin a radius of about three kilometres from the e:.. plosion,
all buildings would be destroyed and 90 per cent of those inhabiting the
area would be casualties (dead and seriously injured);
(b) W ithin a radius of three to six kilometres there would 1xpartial or complete destruction of buildings, and 50 per cent of those
inhabiting the area would be casualties. The survivors would have to be
evacuated;
(c) W ithin a radius of between six and nine kilomet res there would
still be heavy destruction to buildings and about 35 per cent of the
inhabitants would be casualties.
22. It is estimated that 40 per cent of the total population of stich
a city would be casualties as a result of blast and fire alone, and that
60 per cent of the entire city would be destroyed. I n addition, direct
thermal radiation might cause burn casualties and fires as far as ten to
fi fteen kilometres from grou nd-zero.

23. For a ten-megaton explosion over such a hypothetical city,
the area of complete or serious destruction would cover between 300
and 500 sq. km., that is to say the area of the entire citro ).[oreover the effects of blast and direct rad iation would extend well beyond
its boundaries, with heath and forest fires raging up to twenty kilometres from the ground-zero of the explosion. Half of the entire population over an area of radius of some twenty-five kilometres could be
expected to die within the first few days as a result of radio-active contamination, even after allowing for some shelte r provision.
24. In the case of an air-burst of a twenty-megaton bomb the heat
which would result would be intense enough to start fires as fa r as thi rty
kilomet res from a point of detonation, depending on how clear the
atmosphere was at the time, and could endanger the lives of people ill
an area with a radius of nearly 60 kilometres. It has been estimated
that such a device, if exploded over Manhattan, would, in the absence
of shelter or evacuation programmes, probably kill G million out of
New York City's 8 million inhabitants, and lead to an additional one
million deaths beyond the eity limits. The surface explosion of a twentymegaton bomb would result in the formation of a crater 75-90 metres
deep and 800 metres in diameter. (See reference 3 in annex I II.)
ESTI MATE OF EFF ECTS OF A NUCLEAR ATTACK ON A REGION OF A COUNTRY

25. A study was made of the likely results of a nuclear attack 0 11 a
hypothetical industrial region, consisting of nine cities each with populations of over 50,000 inhabitants (some weJl over ), and also containing
140 smaller towns of fewer than 50,000 inhabitants (about sixty of which
contained elements of key indust ry). Assumi ng that a one-megaton bomb
burst at grollnd level in each of the nine cities, the study showed that
12

cumulative estimates of casualties provided a vcry inaclequate measure
of the over-all cffects of the attack. The estimates showed that 20 per
cent of the total population, or 30 per cent of the urban population, or
3S per cent of the key-industrial population would be killed. The houses
destroyed would be 30 per cent of total, or 40 per cent of urban, or
50 per cent of those occupied by key-industrial population. But cities
arc not isolated entities; they are linked in a variety of functional ways,
being dcpendent on each othcr for raw materials of different kinds, as
well as fo r semi-finished and fini shed manufactured goods. Taking the
interaction of effects into account, the study showed that the percentage
of key industry in the whole region (i.e., industry with more than loc.li
significance) which would be brought to a stop would be bet".. een 70 per
cCnt and 90 per cent of the whole. The lowcr figure of 70 per cent takes
account of e\'erything dire<:tly dest royed or completcly disrupted insidc
the targct cities: the higher figure of 90 per cent includes the areas
surrounding the city which would also be indirectly "knocked out"
through, for cxample, failure of communications or supplics of raw materials and food. The more intcrdependent thcy are, thc largcr is thc multiplying factor one has to bea r in mind when estimating the cumulative
effects oi the dest ruction of single cities.
26. Another more general study envisaged a nuclear attack on a
small country, extending about 1,000 km in one direction and 500 km in
the other, i.c., with an area of SOO,CXX> sq. kill. and a population density
of 100 people per sq. km. It was assumed that one pa rt of the country
was attacked with four nuclear weapons each of twenty megatons. Such
an attack would affect about 100,000 sq . km., or some 20 per cent of the
count ry's total expanse by blast, radiation and radio-active contamination. The Q\'cr-all consequcnccs of the deva station would vary according
to the nature of the particular area attackcd, e.g., according to whether
it contained kcy cities, sources of electric power, raw materials or
whethcr it was a prime food-producing arca. But in every case, economic
life would be completcly disrupted and the gencral devastation, including
radio-active contamination from low bursts would be such as to prevent
any immediate assistance being brought to the devastated areas from outside. In hypothctical studics of this kind it has also been estimated that
in the absence of special protection, blast-induced deaths alone resulling
from high level 400 ten-megatoll bombs aimed at United States metropolitan areas, would eliminate more than half of the total American
population of sollie 200 million people. E\'en if they were all in substantial {all-out shelters the same proportion would be killed if the weapon s
were burst at ground level.
27. A Swedish study of the conse(luences of nuclear aUacks against
Swedish cities showed that an attack carried out with about 200 weapons,
ranging from 20 kilotons to 200 kilotons in yield, would result in 2 to
3 million casualties, i.e., 30 to 40 per cent of the tOLl l population of about
7 million people. It also showed that between 30 to 70 per cent of
Swedish industry would be destroyed, and that about two thirds of the
13

industrial workers would receive fatal or 5Cvere injuries. The weight of
attack assumed in this particular silidy is relatively heavy, but none the
less it corresponds to only a small fraction of the nuclear weapons that
are already stockpiled in nuclear arsenals.
28. Swedish studies have also shown that the degree of protection
against radio-active fall-out which might be provided by existing buildings in urban and rural areas in Sweden varies greatly. In no region
would existing buildings provide adequate protection against the higher
levels of radiation which could be experienced in the intense part of the
fall-out area. But effective protection might be provided over the greater
part of the fall-out area, given there had been time to construct shelters,
and to stock thcm wilh food and ot her necessities of life. Even ordinary
buildings, if they remain standing, do provide some protection from the
radiation caused by fall-out.
29. In addition to a need to protect against c.xternal residual nuclear
radiation, i.e., radiation emitted later than one minute after a Tluclear
e:ICplosion, there is the further hazard of internal radiation resulting
from the ingestion of :lIIy radio-active fall-out material that had contaminated food, particularly vegetable food, and in some cases open
water supplies. The amount of radio-active material which could be taken
into the body by way of contaminated food would exceed that (rom the
inhalation of contaminated air or absorption of contaminated water. The
radio-activity of this absorbed material would decay by the emission of
damaging Iluclear radiation.
30. Urbanization clearly increases the haz..'\rd of radio-active contamination because of the concentration of increasing numbers of inhabitants in comparati\'ely small areas. This applies particularly in Europe.
An analysis of about 100 European cities showed that while the larger
cities are on average about thirty to fifty kilometres from each other, the
smaller cities are on average no more than ten to fifteen kilometres
apart. In Germany villages are on average only from one to two kilometres apart. Radio-active contamination, despite a continuous decrease
in intensity, would persist for years following a heavy nuclear attack,
and would create continuing problems in food-producing areas and to
water supplies. Figure Vl illustrates the possible far-ranging effeet of
radio-active fall-out from a twenty-megaton explosion on Hamburg,
while figure VI[ illustrates the similar consequences of a fifteen-megaton
explosion on London (see annex I, table 4, for clinical effects of radiation
doses). It has been calculated that a twenty-megaton explosion 0 11 the
American city of Boston would cause sllch a degree of fall-out over an
area with a radius of nearly fifty kilometres that half of the unsheltered
people on the fringe of this area would die within forty-cight hours.
Even if shelters were provided, high doses of radiation might be received
which, even if not falal, could still produce extensh'e radiation sickness,
as well as long-term somatic and genctic effects.
14
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EH'ECTS ARt SING FROM THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
IN FIELD WARFARE

31. In certain quarters it is still military doctrine that any disparity
in the conventional strength of opposing forces could be redressed by
using nuclear weapons in the zone of battle, This proposition needs to be
considered first in the context that both sides possess these weapons,
and second when the situation is asymmetrical and only one side is a
nuclear weapons Power, Se<:tion III of this report deals with the latter
case, In the former, where the situation is symmetrical, carefully conducted and dispassionate theoretical studies of the lise of nuclear weapons
in field warfare, including analyses of an extensive series of "war games"
relating to the European theatre, have led to the clcar conclusion that
this military doctrine could lead to the usc of hundreds, and not of tens,
of so-called tactical nuclear weapons in the battlcfield area, given that
both sides resort to their use, Without going into the details of these
studies, it can be firmly stated that, were nuclear weapons to be used in
this way, they could lead to the devastation of the whole battle zone,

IS

FIGUIE VII. ESTIMATFJ) ,AU.-oUT COh'TAWINATION AU.A AI'ttII; A 15MEGATON NUCLF..AIt Uf't.OSIO:"i' ON LoNDON. RADIATION DDSE IS GIVEN
FOR J6 IIOUIS AI'TE.I DIt1ONATION

,

'-"-."

::...

' ....,
,!_,':
,

-, ,

:;:::-: Ij .

~)~~r

Almost everything would be destroyed ; forests would be razed to the
ground and only the strongest buildings would escape total destruction.
Fires would be raging e\·erywhere. Circumstances such as these would
be incompatible with the cont inued conduct of military operations within
the zones of devastation.
32. An offensive on the scale to which all these stud ies point, over a
land battle area with a front of, say, 250 kill and SO kill deep, would
render hundreds of thousands, even millions, homeless. Such a level of
destruction could be achieved with only 100 smaJl nuclear weapons in a
European battle area chosen because it did not contain any large towns.
\-Yith 400 weapons, which is not an unreasonably large number if both
sides used nuclear weapons in a battle zone, the physical damage caused
would correspond to somethi ng like six times that caused by all the
bombing of the Second World War- and all sustained in a few days
rather than a few years. If one sets aside the profound, even if unquantiliable psychological effects of such an exchange, the resulting chaos would
still be beyond imagination.
33. The estimates show that with 100 weapons having an average
yield of thirty kilotons (range 5 10 SO kilotons) about one tenth of the
assumed typical European batt le area would be completely devastated,
and about one quarter severely damaged. \Vilh 2(X) weapons about one
fifth would be devastated and half of it severely damaged; and with 400
weapons about one third of the area would be devastated and all severely
16

damaged. Even for only 100 strikes, this represents destruction 011 an
unimaginable scale over an area of about 12,500 sq. kill. In another
European "war-game" study, a lxtttle was envisaged in which the two
opposing sides together used .....eapons whose total yield was between
twenty and twenty-fIve megatons, ill not fewer than 500 and in not Illore
than 1,000 strikes. The nuclear weapons were supposed to have been used
against military targets only, in an area of about 25,0Cl0 sq. km. In this
engagement aLout 3.5 million people would have had thei r homes
destroyed if the weapons had been air-burst, and 1.5 million if the
weapons had been ground-burst. In the former case, at least half of the
people concerned would have been fatally or seriously injured. In the
case of ground-burst weapons, 1.5 million would have been e.xposed to
lethal doses of radiation and a further 5 million to the hazard of considerable although non-lethal doses of radiation.
34. A question which inunediately poses itself is whether military
operations would be compatible with destruction of thc scale indicated by
estimates such as these, A vast civilian population would be involved
unless thc battle took place in desert conditions. Thc number of casualties, civilian and military, cannot be easily related, in any precise way,
to the population actually in lhe area at the time of the lxtttle. Bec.'luse
the need to reduce the level of military casualties would dictate tactics
of dispersal, the number of nuclear strikes necessary to produce asswncd
military results would go up very rapidly. Fear and terror, I>oth in the
civil and military population, might overwhelm the situation.
35. Military planners have no past experience on which to call for
any guide as to how military operations could proceed in circumstances
such as these. When such levels of physical destruction arc reached , one
might well ask what would determine the course of a nucle.'lr battle?
Would it be the number of enemy casualties? Would it be the violent
psychological reaction, fear and terror, to the horror of widespread
instantanCOIlS destruction? Would the chaos immediately bring all military operations 10 a halt? Whatever the answer to these questions, it is
clear enough that the destruction and disruption which would result from
so-called tactical nuclear war would hardly differ from the effe(:ts of
strategic war in the area concerned. The concept of escalation
from tactical to strategic nuclear war could have no possible meaning in
an area within which field warfare was being waged with nuclear
weapons.
36. Thi s picture is not altered if one postulates so-called "clean"
nuclear weapons, in place of those which formed the basis o[ the foregoing studies. Claims have been made about the possiiJilities of providing,
for lxtttlef1eld usc, low yield weapons (say I to 10 kilotons) which would
release an abnormally high proportion of their energy in blast and
nuclear radiation, while producing virtually no radio-acli\'c fall-out.
"Clean", in this context, is a matter of degree. These suggested weapons
would basically rely 011 a fission reaction so that radio-active fall-out
17

could never be completely avoided.!! In any case, the foregoi ng studies
postulated nuclear explosions which yielded minimal radio-acti ve contamination from normal fissio n weapons. The resulting chaos in the
battlefield area was brought about, not by fall-out, but prima rily through
blast effects. Thus, if ;'clean" weapons were ;l\'ailable fo r battlefield usc
it is difficult to believe that similar chaos would not ultimately be produced. Sooner or later lhe battlerleld sitU;ll ioll mllst be expected to
hecome simi lar to that which the foregoing stud ies ha\'e indicated.

blterdiclioll targets
37. Were such weapons e,'er to l:oe used in a war, it is also quite
certain that they would not be restricted to the battle zone itself-even
if it were assumed that there would not be what is usually referred to as
a st rategic exchange. It is part of the concept of tactical nuclear warfare
that in a purely military campaign they would also be used ol\tside the
area of contact in order to impede the movement of enemy forces, the
operation of air forces and so all. The objectives which would be attacked
ill order to achieve these effects are generally called interdiction targets.
Theoretical studies of operat ions of this kind provide a picture of "deep"
nuclear strikes whose effects would be hardly distinguishable from a
strategic nuclear exchange in which both sides set out from the start to
destroy each other's major centres of population. To illustrate what is
implied, reference can be made to a si ngle strike in one such study in
which it was assumed that the railway installations in a major transport
centre were attacked by a single twenty-kiloton bomb, or a single 100kiloton bomb, in order to make the centre impassable to troops and
supplies, and thereby to assist the land battle elsewhere. The railway
centre chosen for this study was a city with 70,()(X) inhabitants living in
23,0Cl0 houses in an area of some fifty sq. km. The bomb was assullled
to be burst at ground level so as to maximize the effects on the railway
lines. T his Illo<le of attack, unlike that used against the Japanese cities,
would at the sallle tillle also maximize local fall-out damage. \Vith the
twenty-kiloton bomb, railway tracks would be demolished over a length
of about 100 metres, a large alllount of spoi l frolll the crater would cover
all lines in the vicinity, block:.tge would be caused by the collapse of road
bridges, rail flyovers and buildings out to about a half~mile from the
burst. All fuel depots and servicing ~heds wo\11d be destroyed. With a
loo-kiloton bomb the scale of damage would, of course, be greater; about
one mile of t rack would be destroyed or blocked by heavy debris, and
the main roads through the town would be completely blocked. The
problem of reopening a road or railway would be hampered by a vast
'The same wou ld apply to larger so-called "clean" \\capons used in a st ra tegic role. In this case there would in additioll be considerable induced radio·activity
caused by the captu re of neutrons in atmospheric nitrogen, thus producing ver)
long-lived radio·active carbon·14. So far ,IS long-range and long-term fall-Qut is
concerned, this radio-active hazard from so-called "cle'LIl" weapons is comparable
in importance to that from less "clean" wca(lOtls. (The foot·note to annex [,
para. 7, applies also to "clean" weapoIiS.)
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amount of radio~aclive debris. It would indeed he so great that it would
almost certainly be easier to build a new by~pass round the town. If
such attacks formed part of a general "intcrdiction" programme of bOlllb~
ing, it stands to reason that the t ransport communication system of ,.
country could be totally wrecked in a very short time, and with it much
more as wei\.
38. The estimated inescapahle collateral effects of bombing a single
railway centre ill sHch a programme of attacks indicate that Illost of the
industrial and commercial property in the midd le of the tOWll would have
been destroyed. Fire would have consumed not only houses but also the
larger buildings and factories not immediately destroyed by the explo~
sion. A t wel1ty~kiloton bomb in an "interd iction" attack on a town which
was a communications centre-and few, if any comlllllllieation centres
are not towns-wou ld kill about a quarter of the 70,000 inhabitants,
while a l OO~kilotol1 attack would kiU abont half. The survivors \Voultl
have to contend with the same ki nd of situation as has been depicted in
the case of the two Jap.1nesc cities bombed in 1945, or the larger city
attacked by a one-megaton weapon which has been described above. A
programme of "interdiction" attacks on targets behind the zonc of con ~
tact of opposing armies, if such a programme included communicat ion
centres as well as airfields, supply depots, armament factorie s and so on,
would be no different in its effects from those of a widespread so~call ed
strategic nuclear exchange between two opposing Powers.
D ETERRENC E OF WAR

39. Nuclear we<lpons consti tute one of the domi nant facts of modern
world politics. T hey are at present deployed in thousands by the nuclear
weapon Powers, with warheads ranging frorn kilotons to megatons. 'A'e
have al reacJy witnessed the experimental explosion of a fifty to sixty~
megaton bomb, i.e .. of a weapon with about 3,000 times the power of
the bomb used in 1945 against Japan. I-I l1ncJred~megatoJl devices.
weapons about 5,000 times the size of those used in 1945, are no more
difficult to devise. They couk] be exploded just outside the atmosphere of
any coulltry, in order utterly to destroy hundreds, even thousands, of
square kilomet res by means of blast and spreading fire. It has been sug~
gested on good authority that in certain geographical circumstances
multi~megat on weapons could also be exploded in ships near coastlines
in order to create enormOllS tidal wa\'es which would engulf the coastal
belt.
40. The effects of all-out nuclear war, regardless of where it
started, could 110t be confined to the Powers engaged in that war. They
themselves would ha\'e to suffer the im1llediate kind of destruction and
the immediate and more enduring lethal fal1~out whose effects have
already been desc ribed. But neigl1bouring coulltries, and even countries
in parts of the world remote from the actual connict, could soon become
exposed to the hazards of radio~activc fall-out prccipitated at great dis~
19

tances from the explosion, after moving through the allllo~phere as a
vast cloud. Thus, at least within the same hemisphere, an enduring
radio-act ive hazard could exist for distant as well as close human J>opulalions, through the ingestion of foods derived irom contaminated vegetation, and the exlernal irradiation due to fall-out particles deposited on
the ground. The extent and nature of the hazard would depend upon the
numbers and type of bombs exploded. Given a sufficient number, no part
of the world would escape exposure to biologically significant levels of
radiation. To a greater or lesser degree, a legacy of genet ic damage could
be incurred by the world's I>opuiation.
41. It is to be expected that no major nuclear Power could attack
another without provoking a nuclear counter-attack. It is even possible
that an aggressor could suffer more in retaliation than the nuclear
Power it first attacked. In this lies the concept of deterrence by the threat
of nuclear destruction. Far from an all-out nuclear exchange being a
rational action which could ever be justified by any set of conceivable
political gains, it may be that no country would, in the pursuit of its
political objectives, deliberately risk the total destruction oi its own
capital city, leave alone the destruction of all its major centres of population ; or risk the resultant chaos which would leave in doubt a government's ability to remain in cont rol of its people. But the fact that a state
of mutual nuclear deterrence prevails between the Super Powers does
not, as we know all too well, pre\·elll the outbreak of wars with conven·
tional weapons involving ooth nuclear and llon-nuclear weapon nations;
the risk of nuclear war remains as long as there are nuclear weapons.
42. The basic facts about the nuclear bomb and its use are harsh
and terrifying for civilization; they have become lost in a mass of
theoretical verbiage. It has been claimed that the world has learnt to live
with the bomb; it is also said there is no need for it to drift un necessarily
into the pos ition that it is prepared to die for it. T he ultimate question
for the world to decide in our nuclear age-and this applies both to
nuclear and non-nuclear Powers-is what short-term interests it is prepared to s..,crifice in exchange for an assurance of survival and security.
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II. ECONmUC IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACQUISITION
AND FURTHEH DEVELOP~1ENT OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

43. Concern about the development and proliferation of nuclear
weapons stems not only from the C<'llamitous effects of possible use but
from the consciousness that the immense resources devoted to their production CQuld instead be used, according to the expressed aim of the
United Nations, "to promote social progress and better standa rds of life
in larger freedom".4
44. To understand Ihe economic implications of embarki ng on the
development of a nuclea r armoury it is necessary to become clear about
the volume and kind of resources such a step demands. The evaluation
needs to be in terms not only of the physical and financial resources
absorbed but of the opportunities foregone through devoting these resources to destructive weapons. It is not easy to come by some of the
relevant information, and no estimates can be better than illustrative.
45. Any gi\'cn size of effort will have economic implications which
differ according to the nuclear and industrial base from which the programme sta rt s. ~'I oreover, a penalty of the arms race is that no size of
programlllC ever satisfies. Even if it became possible to set a limit to an
arsenal of nuclear warheads, their delivery systems and the defence of
their bases can absorb effort indefinitely.
46. The magnitude and timing of any programme depends on the
base of the cou ntry's scientific, technical and industrial capability.
47. Scientific and technical capability determines the country's
ability to undertake the problems of :
(a) P roduction of fissile and other material to meet the necessary
st rict specifications;
(b) Warhead assembly and testing;
(c) Development and control of the delive ry vehicles, whether
missile or aircraft units in an effective operating system.
It involves personnel represented by physicists, chemists, metallurgists,
mathematicians, engineers, skilled machine tool operators, electricians,
pipefitlers, welders, sheet-metal workers, furnace and chemical plant
t
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operators, instrument makers and fabricators, who are essential for
manufacture and assembly of components to the scientific specifications.
48. Industrial capability is measured by the country's established
experience in fields of advanced technology, such as nuclear energy, aviation, electronics and space tech nology.
49. In arriving at the cost figures presented below, countries pos·
sessing the above capabilities have been used as a basis, ami it is there·
fore to be expected that costs would be considerably higher fo r countr ies
which arc less developed and have to devote major efforts to establishing
these basic prerecluisites. It should also Uc remembered that whereas the
development of nuclear am1ament by an industrially developed country
may mean diverting resou rces from work that improves a standard of
life already rather high, the same development on the part of an indus·
Irially developing count ry may have to be done at the expense of the
basic economic needs of a substantial fraction of the population.
50. The estimated costs, supported by some actual figures, for a
first generation of simple nuclear warheads together with an unsophisti.
caled delivery-vehicle system indicate that the acquisition of such a
system may be within the reach of a number of nations. These cost
figures, however, bear hardly any credibility as representing a limit lasting for any signi ficant time, even for an indust rialized country. The
reasoning is that after having acquired the initial unsophisticated nuclear
weapons system, the need to develop less vulnerable and more sophisticated delivery systems seems certain to be felt in order to secu re the military and political object ives of the force. It thus seems lhat the total costs
of acquiring a nuclear we.'pons system over, say, ten years are liable
under certain circumstances to be closer to the costs gi\'en for the French
and United Kingdom s)'Slems up to 1%9, namely, $8.000 million to
$9,000 million Ihan to the $1,700 million to $2,000 million derived be·
low fo r an unsophisticated system. (Any system employing unorthodox
means of delivery, such as a ship or commercial aircraft, has been ruled
out as not a viable course for any nation to pursue. )
51. T he dctail that follows, supported uy annex IV, shows, on the
one hand, that the cost of produci ng the weapons can probably be estimated with fair accuracy, at least in countries with developed peaceful
nuclea r activities. On the other hand, experience has shown that the
major pa rt of the cost of a nuclear force is that of the delivery systems
and, in particular, of the missiles, and these arc liable to vcry large overruns and continuing costly development.
52. The indigenous development of a nuclear weapon capability is
thus scen to demand not only major fi nancial resources but very highly
specialized human resources that are liable to be even more significant.
BASte COSTS OF NUCL E,\R WARUEAOS

53. The three fissile materials suitable for use as nuclear explosives
are uraniul11-23S, plutonium-239 and uranium·233. U rani um-233 is still
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rarc, so its cost has not been considered here. A kilogramme of natural
uranium contains seven grammes of uranium-235, while the main com·
ponent is uran ium-238. For use as a nuclear explosive the uranium·235
has to be scparated and conccntratcd or "enriched" to 90-95 per cent of
total uraniullI. The Cive nuclear weapons Powers have each established
a capability for producing high ly enriched uranium·235. So far as is
known only one process for uranium-235 isotope separation has been
pllt into large-scale lise. h is known as the gaseous diffusion process and
is applied to gaseous lITanium-hcxafluoride (UFe). This process requires
large and costly plants b.,sed on an advanced technology which has not
been fully disclosed. The total cost of the three United States plants was
around $2,300 million, and the annual operating costs were estimated at
from $500 million to $600 million, resulting in a cost of $11,000 to
$12,000 per kilogramme of weapons-grade uTanium. Some twenty-five
kilogrammes of this material would be required for the prodllction of one
nuclear warhead with a yield in the twenty-kiloton range. Uranium-235
is preferred O\'er plutonium for the production of thermonuclear weapons
(H-bombs).
54. Plutonium-239 results from exposing uranium·238 to neutrons
in a nuclear reactor. It is estimated that some eight kilogrammes of
95 per cent plutoniulll-239 would be needed for a nuclear warhead
yielding a twenty-kiloton explosion.
55. A complete plutonium-239 production complex would require
plants for concentrating uranium ore, refining the uranium to high
purity, and probably reducing it to metal ingot, and for fabricating
reactor fuel , a nuclear reactor, a chemical plant for plutonium extraction
and one for reducing plutonium to metal, together with numerous service
facilities. F or production complexes with capacities in the range of 8.160
kilogrammes of weapons-grade plutonium per year, the capital costs
would be in the range of $22-$87 million, and the annual operating costs
$5-$10 million, resulting in a cost of $900,000 per kilogramme of plutonium for the small complex and $120,000 per kilogramme for the
larger complex over the ten-year programme.
56. Considering the high cost of the gaseous diffusion plant for
uranium-235, it would seem that a country planning to make only a
small number of nuclear warheads per year would go to the plutonium
type. This is particularly so if it has an established activity in the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy, since pl utonium is produced as a by-product in
1110St nuclear reactors.
D~:S I GNING, MANU~'ACTURING AND TESTING

57. The amount of published information relating to warhead as·
sembly and test ing is severely limited by military secrecy.
58. According to a Swedish study made for the purpose of this
report the capital investments in a factory for assembling ten warheads
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per year would be about $8 million and allnual operating costs about
$1 million.
59. According to the same Swedish study the total costs of testing
one twenty-kiloton device underground would amount to $12 million, and
the costs of testing four such devices would amount to $15 million.
COSTS }o'OR VARIOUS WARUEADS PRODUCTION PROGRAMMES

Pili/onium warheads production programme

60. Based on the estimated cost figures given for plutonium production and warhead design, manufacturing and testing, the total estimated costs of a small programme (one twenty-kiloton warhead per year
over ten years) and a moderate programme (ten twenty-kiloton warheads per year over ten years) are shown below in table 1. The small
programme would cost $11 million per year, i.e., $ 11 million per warhead, whereas the moderate programme would cost $19 million per year,
resulting in a warhead lInit price of $1.9 million. If the Sl11al1 programme
could be combined with plutonium production in a large po .....er reactor,
the annual costs might be reduced to $6 million and consequently the
warhead unit costs to $6 million.
TABU;

I.

ESTIMATED COSTS FOIt VARIOUS PLUTQSlUM-BASF.D WARIIEAD
rRODUCT IOS PROGRAMMES

(In SUS millions)
S ... al/ IW'gTa",,,u

(t'Xl,.liI",,,,, dnnul
...."

l u J~"")

M~Jr'''''I!'<'i"a''' ...r

U"X2fUril,.,,,,,

"n""w

WI'r U .. J~"")

Fissile material
Design and manufacture ...............
Testing .......... . ................... .
Storage, maintenance ...................

70.0
18.0
12.0
4.0

151.0

TOTAl.

104.0

188.0

Annual aV(Tage ...... ............ .....
Cost per warhead......................

11.0
11.0

19.0

18.0
15.0

4.0

1.9

Production programme including thermonuclear warheads
61. The escalation of the total warheads production costs resulti ng
from the construction and operation of a diffusion plant for enrich ing
uranium-235 and the development and testing of thermonuclear weapons
is well demonstrated by the French example shown in table 2. The
gaseous diffusion plant was built after 1960.
Cost oj deli"/.·ery vehicles

62. Table 3 gives a summary of the reported procurement and
operation costs for a variety of delivery vehicles. ranging from ele24

T ABLE 2. COSTS Of TOTAl. FKI'.~CII N UCI. EAR WARH EAD!> rROGKAMME

(hI SUS million.f)
Fi~ .. I~

I'rD</ u C/;ON

Do,o" Q"d
", " .. ufQ(I ... ~

160
8SO

460

"'alr""1

To 1960 .................
1960-1964 ...............
1965-1970 ....................
GRAND TWA!.

'0

T~J li ..g

TqMi

240

300

'"

1,640
3,180

5,060

1,040

500

340

(10 1%4)

(to 1964)

(10 1964)

mentary to sophisticated systems. The table indicates that the total
delivery vehicle costs in most circumstances will be greater than the
nuclear weapons costs .
63. T he accuracy with which delivery vehicle costs were predicted
has been notoriously poor. Heavy overruns of expenditures have been
the rule rather than the exception and have been concurrent wilh lengthy
delays in the projected time~tables. Many instances exist of the deploy~
ment of ext remely costly but already obsolescent weapons systems, which
were withdrawn a very short time after their initial deployment. Further~
more, while it is not always correct, it can be generally assumed tha t the
accuracy of cost and time estimates for both the development and pro~
duetion of delivery vehicles is a function of prior related experience.
Over rulls are therefore more likely to be incurred when a count ry
embarks on its first-generation development.
64. The time needed to develop a delivery system depends on the
existing industrial base and related e:.:perience and would, ill most cases.
take at least ten years for reasonably industrialized nations. Costs can be
spread over time, but peaks occur at certain point s. Obsolescence and
countermeasures costs are related to the time factor.
65. Monetary costs do not, by themselves, give a realistic picture
of the necessary effort ill terms of over-an resources. A sizab!e technological base is needed to create and maintain a force of delivery vehicles.
66. Induded here are the necessary skilled workers, engineers,
scientists and managers, fabrica ting faciliti es, experimental facilities, test
ranges, etc. Even if major components can be purchased abroad, the
delivery system must be integrated into a workable whole, and this
process requires the skills of a number of qualified persons, which may
even e:.:ceed the number needed for warhead production.
PROCURE:MEr;'T COSTS SU MMAR\'

M odest /wclear capacity

67. It will be assumed that a modest but signific.1nt nuclear annament would be represented by a force of from thirty to fifty jet bomber
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TABU;

J.

SU~IMAItV OF OD..III£ltV H':liICI.& PROCU RUI£l'o"T A:;O OPEilATIONS COSTS

(Costs ill $US lIIillio l1 s)
S:1J'~'" COUfIM:1

Sy,"m dornt"""

Aircraft. elementary . ........... 30-50 bombers (Cmbcrra. B-57)
~Iissile.

il:

elementary..

A'
f
IfCfa t,

III

. ....

w missi lcs in 50ft emlliacemem. 1.OOO-kll1 range ...... .. .......... .
missiles in soft emlllaeemel1 t: 3. 000-km range .................. .
{50
IJ US Atla ~ squ<ldrons (140 missiles) ................... .. ...... .

cd'
II
f50-60 French :\lirage IV bombers ................................ .
lum- ew . ... ..... . JOO Br itish V-bombers with air-to-surface missiles ................ .

P.""Mrrmr" ,

cuu

-...
180
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A"""p/ ote r O/ifIll

..",u

25
5
10

4,900

2 (per missile)

1,800

100
120

50 :\Iinutem.<ln I. in hard emplacements. IO.()(X}-km range .......... .
Missile, medium-level .......... 2S Fr~nd.l SSRS in liard cmJ1la~~len ts. 4.000-km range .......... .
{ 14 US Titan squadrons ( 140 miSSiles) . ................ .......... .

4,900

5
Not aV;lilable
Not available

Aircraft, sophisticatcd ........... 210 US FB- III "ith SRA:\I air-to-surface missiles ........... ... .

2.200

J.W ( total to 1971)

:\l i55ile. sophisticated ........

1,250
700

J French missile-launching nuclear submar ines, each with 16 missiles
of 3,000-km range ........................................ .... .
1.000
{ 41 US Polaris launching submari ne~. each with 16 miniles ........ . 13.000

20
Not available

aircraft (table 3), together with fifty medium-range missiles of the
3,OOO-kilometre range in soft emplacements and 100 plutonium warheads.
The sum of the costs estimated above fo r such a system acquired and
deployed over ten years would be at least $1,700 million, averaging
$170 million per year.

Small, /ligh-qlwlily IIue/ear force
68. A Polish study has been made for the purpose of this report to
estimate the costs of a smail, high-quality nuclear force. A hypothetical
programme comprising two stages each of five years' duration has been
envisaged. By the end of the first stage (1968- 1972) a nuclear fo rce of
from ten to fiftccn bombers and from fifteen to twenty nuclear weapons
would be established, ami during the second stage ( 1973- 1977) the force
would be extended to include from twenty to thirty thermonuclear
weapons, 100 intenneJ iate range missiles ;uul two mi ssile-launching
nuclear submari nes. T he total costs oi such a programme based on
domestic industry and resources would alllount to $5,600 million, corresponding to an average annual cost of $560 million for ten years. This
hypothetical programme could be considered as a scaled-down version
of the f rench programme. The cost estimate is considerably lower than
tlte expenditures in France and the United Kingdom. Both are in the
course of establishing high-quality nuclear forces of moderate size.
French costs fo r thei r military nuclear programme to 1%9 have been
estimated at $8,400 million, and the United K ingdom costs to 1%9 are a
similar amount. Annual outlays of $50 million were representative of
the early French programme, but outlays later rose to as llIuch as
$I,<XX) million in a single year.
69. The actual annual costs of the nuclear forces in some countries
are shown ill table 4. The costs are also given relative to the allnual
defcnce budgets and the gross national product (GNP).
TAIII.I: 4 . A CTU AL COSTS Of N UC U :AI< ml<CES
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.Ifi:ilor v

6.0
5.0
26.4
23.3
21.1
16.8
14.6
]2.1

2.4

2.1
1.8
I.J

1.2
1.2

70. Compari son of the figures given in table 4 should !)e made
with caution, partly because they refer to countries at different stages of
nudtar weapons development, and JXlrlly beeause the size of the respective nuclear forces is not known.
Eco~oM Ie 1M pr.ICATIONS

71. \Vhat has been defined as a modest nuclear armament requi res
not only a len-year programme costing the equivalent of $US 170 million
per year but resources of special kinds and quality. The basic ingredients
would !)e raw materials, a corps of skilled engineers and expert scientists
and a modern industrial base. A study of the number of scientific and
technical personnel required by a nation to build installations in which
nuclear warheads could !)e produced on a continuous basis has estimated
that approximately 1,300 engineers and 500 scientists would be needed.
Sophisticated delivery systems are equally demanding of high-quality
materials and skills. For production of the intermediate-range ballistic
missiles, estimates suggest that manpower requirements for technical and
skilled personnel would rise higher than those for nuclear weapons. To
produce over ten yea rs and deploy fifty such mi ssi les, it is estimated that
a pcak labour fo rce of 19,000 men directly applied would be needed, over
5,000 of them scientists and engineers with access to high-speed electronic computers. Skilled personnel would include physicists, aerodynamic, mechanical, and other engineers and large numbers of production workers, including mach ine operators and welders. The suggested
fleet of fifty bombers would require a minimum of from I to 2 million
man-hours of skilled and unskilled labour just to assemble. The design
and development st.:'ge would absorb an additional 2 million or more
engineering man-hours, which would involve highly skilled efforts in
ae rodYllamics, stress analysis, design work and fli ght testing.
72. To compare the hypothetical nuclear armament costs with other
major national expenditures, reference has been made to statistical information available to the United Nations and published in several editions
of the Statistical Y rarbook. At this time most of such information is
available for the year 1964. Expenditures are always expressed in units
of the national currency. The largest uncenainties in making comparisons
arise when a variety of e..'xchange rates are quoted for the currency under
different ci rcumstances and when currencies become unstable. Further
differences arise because nations operate under different economic systems and beeause accounts arc kept on differing bases. Because of all
these differences it is possible to make only rough comparisons, such as
illustrated in figure VIII.
73. Fi fty countries which, on the basis of populat ion and total
expenditures, were seen to be the largest, were selected. Expenditures
for 1964 on defence, education and health are reported in the United
Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1965 (United Nations publication, Sales
No.: 66.XV II.I ), tables 192 and 185, for most but not all of the fifty.
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The graph in figure VIII shows these reported expenditures and the
number of countries with that or a higher expenditure for each of the
three fields, defence, education and health.
74. H orizontal lines are drawn corresponding to the two illustrative expenditures of $170 million (US equivalent) per year for a modest
nuclear force, and of $560 million per year for a small high-quality force.
T he graph shows that these levels would represent a very large component of the total defence expenditure for all except about the eleven
largest countries, that is, seven countries in addition to the existing
nuclear weapons Powers included in the graph. About twenty countries
have higher total defence expenditures than that for the mode~t nuclear
armament of $170 million per year.
75. It thus appears that there are only abolll seven countries in the
world, other than the five nuclear weapons P owers, that could contemplate an added expenditure of Sl70 million a year to develop a modesl
nuclear armament without reallocating a major part of their tC!:hnical
resources from constructive activities. For the small nuclear capabil ity
suggested, costing $560 million a year, only the seven appear capable
of finding the necessary resources.
76. What may be derived correctly from the graph is an appreciation of the rclative magnitude of the expenditure on a nuclear force
compared with other government expenditures on defence, education and
health. Any further deductions from the graph should be made with
caution, for it must be remembered that accounts arc not kept in the
same way and rates of currency exchange \'ary. !I'f oreover, what are
reported are central and regional government expenditurcs, and in many
countries education and health are to a considerable extent financed
otherwise.
I MPLICATlONS OF EXPECTE]) GRO WTH OF PLUTONIU M RESOURCES

77. T here are two observations that we can make. First, that the
cost of development of simple nuclear warheads is progressively decreasing as the technology involved is increasi ngly becoming puulic knowledge,
and a new country can avoid the unprofitable directions which the countries that pioneered had to discover through costly experience. Second,
that the large-scale development of nuclear pOlller projects, resulting
from a break-through in capital as well as operating costs, compa red to
conventional power stations, will make available a very large capacity
of potential producers of weapons-grade plutonium. It is estimated that
by 1980 there would be in the world more than 3 X 1()6 megawatts of
nuclear power production. This would involve the production of plutonium sufficient for thousands of bombs each year. This illustrates the
enormity of the problem that the world faces, a problem coupled with
the peaceful application of atomic cnergy.
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Ill. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACQUISITION
AND FURTH ll lt DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
I NTRODUCT ION

78. In concluding this report, it is necessary to discuss the implications to security of the acquisition and further development of nuclea r
weapons. The task is not an easy one. This particular issue, whether
viewed in a national or an international context, constitutes one of the
major subjects of present-day political and strategic dehate. It is one
which is perhaps best approached historica!1y.
HI STORY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

79. As recalled in section I, it was in 1945, at the end of the
Second \\lorld \Nar, that the world learnt that a nuclear weapon of mass
destruction had been developed by the United States of America. I n the
reOllization that this development CQuid imply dire consequences fo r
mankind, the unanimous first resolution of the General Assembly of the
United Nations was that atomic energy should be placed under international control and that atomic weapons should be eliminated from
national arsenals. The attempt failed. A nuclear arms race then began.
In 1949, the Un ion of Soviet Socialist Republics revealed that it, too, possessed nuclear weapons. The race acquired new dimensions when both
Powers developed the II -bomb with an explosive power of megatons and
when it was also demonstrated that nuclear warheads could be delivered
accurately not only by airc raft but, over practically limitless ranges, by
means of intercontinental rocket s. From this grew the realization that
were one side to attack with nuclear weapons, the other could instantly
retaliate in kind, whether or not there were any differences in the numbers of bombs they possessed. So it was that the concept of strategic
nuclear deterrence evolved. The reality of thi s concept is indicated by
the fact that whatever the political conflicts between the two super
Powers over the past fifteen years, Ihey have not engaged in any direct
military conflict. Fear of the disastrous consequences of the explosion of
even a few nuclear bombs has so far contrihuted towards inhibiting any
action which might ha,'e triggered their use.
80. T he efTort to maintain a state of nuclear deterrence has demanded the expenditure of vast resources and, paradoxically, far from
increasing the sense of security, has at limes engendered a sense of
insecurity. The opposing sides have taken, and continue to take. major
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steps to assure themselves that their lIuclear warheads and del ivery
vehicles are proof against whatever countermeasures might be undertaken by the other side. These countermeasures are essentially designed
to increase the chances of a nuclear armoury surviving a pre-emptive
nuclear assault by the other side and of nudear weapon,; being able to
penetrate whatever defences the other might deploy. The reciprocal
technological development and sophistication of nuclear warheads and
their associated weapons systems which thus results constitut e a spiralling nuclear arms race. Short of mutllal agreement, it is a race which has
no end, and one which leads 1I0t to a uniform state of security but, as has
been said, to phases of major insecurity which alternate wilh periods in
which relative security seems assured. The pace of Ihis race cannot be
expected to slow down until concrete steps are taken which lead 10 disarmament and which promOle the security of all nations.
81. The United Kingdom, which had been associated with the
United States during the S('(ond World War in the early development
of nuclear weapons, subsequently developed, on its own, a smaller nuclear
armou ry, and, at the start, dclivery systems as well. Canada, which had
cooOperated with the United Kingdom during the war in the development
of nuclear teclmology, decided not to embark on the manufacture of
nuclear weapons. On the other hand, France, some of whose scientists
had also taken part with the United Kingdom and Canada in the wartime collaborative elTort in nuclear technology, began the development
of its own nuclear weapons and delivery vchicles in the 1950s. The
People's Republic of Chilla has recently become Ihe fifth State 10 follow
the sallie course. The exact nUllIber of nuclear warheads which may now
exist in the world is not known, but it is quite certain that the anns
race between the Un ited States and the Union of Soviet Social ist Republics alone has resulted in Ihe production of weapons whose cumulative
destructive power is more than sufficient to eliminate all mankind.
TU E CUlun~ NT PROSPECT

82. So far as international security is concerned, it is highly
probable that any further increase in the number of nuclear weapons
States or any further elaboration of existing nuclear arsenals would lead
to greater tension and greater instability in the world at large. Both
these aspects of the nuclear arlllS race are significant to world peace.
The mounting concern about the spread and development of nuclear
weapon s is a clear manifestation of the fear which now be,;ets the world.
Additional nuclear Powers accentuating regional tensions could only add
to the complexity of the problem of assuring peace. Furthermore, it is
impossible to deny the propo~ili o ll that the danger of nuclear war breaking out through accident or miscalculation becomes greater, the larger
the number of countries which deploy such weapons and the larger the
stockpiles and the more diversified the weapons they hold. If a nuclear
conflict were to erupt, however it started, not a single State could feel
itself secure. Even if a State were not subjected to direct attack, and even
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if it should not experience any immediate consequences of such an
attack, it could nevertheless suffer as a result of later radio-active fallOllt. It was largely because the whole world was concerned about the fallout from the Iluclear tests of the 19505 and early 1960s that the principal
international agreement so far concluded to limit the spread of nuclear
weapons-the partial ban on nuclear tests-was signed in 1963.
83. Everyone of the five nations known to have nuclear weapons
describes its motives for developing a nuclear arsenal as purely tacticaldefensive and/or defensive by deterrence. Not one would claim that it
had developed the weapons because of their value as weapons of offence.
Bllt the transformations which have occurred over the past twenty years
in the balance of strategic power in the world, as well as what is implied
by nuclear war, have produced a vastly different scene from the one
which existed at the start of the Second World War. It is also plain from
the history of the past twenty years that the possession of a nuclear
arsenal docs not, and cannot, signify the same thing to different countries, either in terms of military power or of pol itical security. Correspondingly, it stands to reason that count ries which have not embarked
upon the development of nuclear weapons will have refrained from so
doing \.Iccause of a variety of differing views about the advantages and
disadvantages of such a step.
84. The possibility of an increase in the number of count ries acquiring a nuclear arsenal is attributable to different sets of motives. In some
quarters the fact that the existi ng nuclear weapons Powers have so far'
failed to reach agreement either about stopping the furt her development or
of freezing or reducing their own nuclear arsenals is regarded as an argument for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other nations. In searching for greater security, some may also helieve that if a state of mutual
deterrence has been generated between the existing nuclear weapons
Powers, a corresponding situation could be created between any other
Powers who already possess the industrial and technological background
necessary to make bombs and, in future, between countries which do not
as yet do so. But agai nst such views, it is worth noting that nowhere has
the development of nuclear weapons made it possible to dispense either
with troops on the ground or with conventional arms. Any new country
which embarked on the production of nuclear weapons would soon find
that it had entered a new anns race without having provided itself with
the option of abandoning the old. T hus, the burden of an arms race with
conventional weapons is compounded as soon as a nat ion embarks upon
the path of acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover, the insecurity which
would be brought about by entering the nuclear arms race would make
it imperative to improve continuously the sophistication of the nuclear
weapons and their delivery systems, as well as measures for providing an
early warning of an impending attack. The nuclear arms race demands
immense technological and other resources and, of itself, creates conditions under which the economic progress of a nation could stagnate. The
internal insecurity engendered by the diversion of resources can be
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quite as serious as the external threat to the nation. Again, the acquisition by any nation of nuclear weapons could also trigger a change in its
international relations. Non-nuclear neighbours could be tempted to
acquire nuclear weapons, or they might perhaps undertake immediate
preventive military action. II aving nuclear Wea\XlIlS on one's own territory might bring with it the penalty of bc<:ollling a direct target for
nuclear attack A nuclear capaoility intended to deter or offset another
on a bilateral basis would be confronted with changing alliances and
changing balances of power. What had been intended to be a military
answer to one set of threats might then appear inadequate, subject to
(Iuick neutralization or elimination in the event of an outbreak of nuclear
hostilities. Similarily, the existing nuclear Powers might react by countemleasures and/or auempts to strengthen their own position in the
region and thereby intensify their own arms race. Nuclear weapons nations are also faced with the problems of establ ishing systems of control
of nuclear weapons within thei r own borders. Not only must there be
protection against misuse; the tensions which would exist if serious
civil st rife were to occur in a nat ion that possessed nuclear weapons
would be greatly intensified. If these problems arc not adequately solved,
there are added risks to the security of that nation and to the world as a
whole. It is presumably for reasons such as these that the emergence of
a fourt h and then a fifth nuclear weapons Power has not stimulated
further proliferation over the past three years. But the situation remains
far from stable. Even the world-wide concern about proliferation, which
the major Powers clearly share, has not as yet led to any measures of
nuclear disarmament.
85. Clearly any anns race absorbs resources which might otherwise be used to improve standards of living. The struggle to improve
Jiving conditions is most effectively pursued when ad\'anced tcclmological
products are freely exchanged between countries. T his process is hindered by the Illutual fears and suspicions associated with an arms race.
The peaceful uses of atomic energy, now still on a small scale, are
expected in the years ahead to berome of major significance to world
prosperity. Most nations are member States of the International Atomic
E nergy Agency, which was established "to accelerate and enlarge the
contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout
the world". In rCC'Cnt years they have agreed about the need to develop
a system of safeguards involving inspections to assure that materials
and facilities acquired to assist a programme of peaceful uses are not
diverted to any mil itary purpose. In no c.1se does Ihe Agency assist any
trade leading to nuclear wea]XlIlS. The achievement of the Agency's
mission is of considerable importance to the peaceful development of
the whole world.
T HE I SSUE o~' TACTICAL WEAPO:':S

86. A second motive additional to the search for "security th rough
deterrence" which might encourage proliferation is the view that nuclear
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weapons constitute a form of armament superior to conventional weapons
in field warfare. Some military commentators assume that armies could
use such weapons against eaeh other within the zone of contact of a
battle area. If only one side to a dispute possessed and deployed nuclear
weapons and was known 10 be ready to use them so as to ach ieve its
objectives, regardless of any international repercussions, the possibi lity
exists that it might gain an advantage either from the threat of using
them- that is to say, the threat itself would deter the military actions of
its opponent-or from the results of thei r actual usc. It is also just
credible that if bolh sides were to possess such weapons, whatever their
actual nature, and one, two or e\'cn a few were to be exploded. the two
sides would disengage because of the realization, having observed the
consequences of their use, that the conflict might escalate into an uncontrollable conflagration. These thi ngs arc pos.sible. Bul the contra ry is far
more likely. It is hardly likely thai a non-nuclear-weapons country, living
in a state of hostility with a neighbour, could start to furnish itself with
a nuclea r arsenal without either driving its neighbour to do the s..,me or
to seek protection in some form or other, explicit or implicit, from an
existing nuclear weapons P ower or Powers. Equally, if in the pursuit
of its political objectives, aile of two sides, both of which possessed and
deployed nuclear weapons, were to have the will to initiate the use of its
weapons, it is difficult to see how a nuclear engagement could be stopped
once it had started. The speed of military reaction and experience of past
military operations do IlOt encourage any opposite conclusion. From what
has been said in section I of the report, it is clear that , given that both
sides to a confli ct deploy nuclear weapons, it is highly debatable whether
there are any circumstances of land warfare in which such weapons could
be used as hattlefield weapons or, if they were so used, would confer any
military advantage to either side in the zone of contact. Whatever significance can be attributed to tactical nuclear wea{Xlns is to be found essentially in the concept of deterrence.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS I N TilE POL I TICAL CONTE XT

87. The third argument which is sometimes advanced in favour of
the aC(luisition of nuclear weapons is that doing SO promotes political
independence, enhances national prestige and thus a country's influence
on the international scene. A contrary "iew is that the influence of certain Po\\ ers in international affairs would be the same whether or not
they possessed nuclear weapons. T he issue of prestige is equally debatable. Undoubtedly there may for a short time be some imponderable
clement of prest ige in the manifestation of the technological prowess
which is implied by the development of nuclear weapons. )Jut this
prestige is a mixed blessing and could rapidly generate those deleteriou s
reactions on Ihe part of neighbou ring States to which reference has
heelllllade in a preceding paragraph.
88. When one asks whether or nOI the acquisition and further
development of nuclear weapons increases security, one thus ends tip
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wilh two very simple questions. The first is what, in fact , have nuclear
weapons contributed SO far to military power? In so far as this question
can be answered, the reply can only be that while the nuclear weapons
Powers have never suffered aggression on their own territories, and
while the state of mutual deterrence which prevails between the two
super Powers has helped to avert any head-on conflict between them and
has indeed imposed a new kind of restraint in their political actions with
respect to each other, it has not made it possible for either to reduce
its military expenditures in general or to neglect the effectiveness of its
conventional annoury in particular. Tn a smaller way, the same conclusion applies to both the United Kingdom and France.
89. At the same time, profound limitations clearly exist in the possible use of these weapons. T he consequences of their employment either
in all-out war or in field warfare would be so disastrous to hath sides
that it is very difficult to conceive of circumstances in which they could
be used. Where two sides possess such weapons, it is totally unrealistic
to suppose that one could lise them in a military connict without provoking retaliation by the other. Once retaliation had occurred, it is also
difficult to suppose that a nuclear conflict would not escalate in intensity.
T he possibi lity that it might not cannot be excluded; but the chances
are much greater that it would. The situation might, of course, be totally
different if only one side to a localized conflict possessed nuclear
weapons. But here one needs to observe that views about the value of
nuclear we..pons as actual inst ruments of military power vary just as
much in States that do not possess nuclear weapons as in those that do.
For example, over the past twenty years non+nuclear-we..pons cou ntries
have not been deterred from engaging in battle on or ncar their own
ground with States possessing nuclear weapons. In these encounters, the
latter have not found that their possession of nuclear weapons and their
deployment in the theatre of operations has made the course of conventional war any easier. lndeed, since the end of the Second World \Var,
no nuclear weapons State has been able to dcrive ally immediate military
advantage from the possession of nuclear weapons, let alone use them
to gain an easy victory.
90. The second question is in what way, if at all, does the possession of nuclear weapons strengthen power; or what quality, if any,
do such weapons impart to it ? This is a much more difficult question.
National secu rity and political powcr are tenuous concepts. There arc
countries which enjoy a high measure of both, regardless of the fact
that they do not count among the military Powers of the world. Equally,
while the nuclear Powers have at times been able to exercise immense
polit ical power and economic innuence in world affairs, there have also
been moments in recent history where this has not been so, regardless
of the great nuclear forces of which they dispose. Correspondingly, the
possession of nuclear forces does not necessarily prevent a decline in
political influence. Were the acquisition and maintenance of a Iluclear
arsenal to impose a major economic and technological burden on a
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country, it is possible that possession of such an arsenal would be associated with a reduction, and not with an increase, in both the national
security and political inOuence of the coullt ry concerned.
CONCLUSION

91. Since the sense of insecurity on the part of nations is the
cause of the arms race, which in turn enhances that very insecurity, and
in so far as nuclear armaments are the end of a spectrum which begins
with conventional weapons, the problem of reversing the trend of a
rapidly worsening world situation calls for a basic reapprai~al of all
interrelated factors. The solution of the problem of ensuring security
cannot be found in an increase in the number of Stales possessing
nuclear WC.1pOilS or, indeed , in the retention of nuclear weapons by the
Powers currently possessing them. An agreement to prevent the spread
of nuclear weapons as recommended by the United ~ations, freely negotiated and genuinely observed, would therefore be a powerful step in
the right direction, as would also an agreement on the reduction of
existi ng nuclear arsenals. Security for all countries of the world must be
sought through the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and
the banning of their use, by way of general and complete disarmament.

92. A comprehensive lest ban treaty, prohibiting the underground
testing of nuclear devices, would also contribute to the objec:tives of nonproliferation and would clearly help to slow down the nuclear arms race.
So would effective measures safeguarding the security of nOll-nuclear
countries. Nuclear-weapon-free zones additional to tho~e of Antarctica
and Latin America, covering the maximum geographical extent possihle
and taking into account other measures of arms control and di~arll1amellt,
would equally be of major assistance.
93. These mc.1StlreS are mentioned neither to argue the case for
them nor to set them in any order of priority. What the analysis of the
wbole problem shows is that anyone of them, or any combinatiou of
them, cou ld help inhibit the further multiplication of nuclear weapons
Powers or the further elaboration of existing nuclea r arsenals and so
help to ensure nat ional and world security. But it mllst be realized that
these measures of arms limitation, however desirable, cannot of themselves eliminate the threat of nuclear conflict. They should be regarded
not as ends sufficient in themselves but only as measures which could
lead to the rednction of the level of nuclear armaments and the lessening
of tension in the world and the eventual elimination of nude.1r annament s. All countries have a dear interest in the evolution of a world
which allows of peaceful and stable C(lCxistence. ~on-nudear weapon
countries. as well as those which po~sess nuclear weapons, need to work in
concert. creating conditions in which there !>hould be free access to materials, e(luipmcnt and information for achieving all the peaceful benefits of
atomic energy, and for promoti ng international security.
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94. This report gives the bare outline of the disasters which could
be associated with the use of nuclear weapons. It discusses the nature
and varicty of the economic burden they impose. And it unhesitatingly
concludes from the considerations that have been sel out that whatever
the path to national and international security in the future, it is certainly not to be fou nd in the further spread and elaboration of nuclear
weapons. The threat of the immeasurable disaster which could befall
mankind were nuclear war ever to erupt , whether hy miscalculation or
by mad intent , is so real that informed people the world over understandably become impatient for measures of disarmament additional to
the few measures of arms limitation that have already been agreed to-the limited b.."ln on testing, the prohibition of nuclear weapons in outer
space, and the nuclea r-free zone of Latin America. International agreement against the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and agreements on measures of arms control and disarmament will promote the
seeurity of all countries. T he United Nations has the overridi ng responsibility in thi s field. The more effective it becomes in action, the more
powerful il s authority, the greater becomes the assurance fo r man's
fulure. And the longer the world waits, the more nuclea r arsenals grow,
the greater and more diflicult becomes the eventual task.
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A ll ttpx I

GENERAL CIIAIL\CTERlSTICS OF NUCLEAR EXI'LOSIONS
I. The yield of a nuclear II'eallOn is expressed in terms of the energy released
II hen it i$ exploded. compared wilh Ihe energy li berated by the explosion of the
chemical ex plosive trinitrotoluene ( T NT). The biggest bombs ever made from con\'entional explosive contained the equivalent of about iO tOIl$ of TNT. A otic-kiloton
nuclea r w~lIOn produce! lhe same amount of energy as 1,000 tons of TNT. Correspondingly, a one-megaton weapon would release energy equi\'a\cnt to 1 million
tons (or 1,000 kilotons) o f TNT. Using polledu\ r ockets, any such weapons
could be delivered, ill [e55 Ihall all IlOur, bct\\ccn any two points 011 earth. Nuclear
explosions of more than fifty meg<ltons have <llready occurrtd and even larger
0lle5 are possible, since there apl~ars to be 110 upper limit to tile) icld of a nuclear
weapon excepl in tenllS o f practicable si~e and weight.

Is

Til t: ATMOSI'HERE

2. When a nuclear weapon is exploded in the atmosphere, 50 per cent of its
total energy is releastd as blast and shock, 35 per cent as thermal rad i:l\ion and
15 IJoe r cent as nuclear mdiatiol1 (see figure I X). These l) rO]lOrtions vary according to whelher the explosion is carried out ill Ihe atmosphe re, or al altitudes
gre:.ter than 100,000 fee t, or underground. At high altitudes, the prOl)()rtion of
!'IGUIt£ IX.

DI STRIIlUTIOX OF ENERGY IN AS AIR-BURST OF A FISSIOS
AT AS AI.TITUUE 0.' U;SS T Ii AS 100,000 Y.:f:r

Initial
nuclear radiation
(5 per cent)

Residua l
nuclear radial ion
(10 per cenl)
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energy converted into blast would be decreased while the proportion of intense
therm nl rndintion would be increased; in the underground case, no the rmal radiation would escape. A nuclear explosion thus differs charactcristkally from an
explosion caused by conventional explosivu, not only in that its explosh'e power
is several orders of magnitude greater than for a conventional explosive of the
same mass, but also in so far as it resnlts in effects from thermal and IlnclC:lr
radi:ltion.
3. The bl:lst effects and associated overpressures from any particular nuclear
explosion depend on the power of the weapon exploded and the altitude at which
the explosion oceurs (tables I and 2). The thermal radiation travels through the
atmosphere :It the speed of light and to dis t:lnces depending on visibility through
the atmosphere at the time of the explosion (see fignre X). It can be of sufficient
intensity from a one-megaton explosion 011 a fairly clear day to cause moderately
severe burns on exposed skin o\"er a radius of twenty kilometres (table 3). The
FIGURE X.

T OTAL TIIEln!A\. EN.:I\GY D.:UVEREO, AS A fliNCTIO;O;" 0.' DISTANCE FROM
A 2O-KTLOTON N t: CT.f.AR IX).\JII, FOR II!.·FERENT ATMOSP IH.RIC VISIBII .1TU:S
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heat might be felt as far away as 120 km. Serious fires could be started in
cities and [orcst~, possibly leading to fire-storms, i.e., gigantic fires in which air
is sucked into the centre of the burning region to create a flaming fUllnel which
destroys everything within it. For atmospheric explosions, having an energy
greater than one megaton, Ihcse distanccs would be C\'en greater. It has been
estimated thJt 011 a clear day. a ten-megJton bomb cxplo(lL-d at an altitude of fifty
kilometres wonld scorch the earth's surface over an area "ith a radius of some
seventy kil ometres. The thermal energy received per unit area, at a specified dislance from a nuclear explosion, is usually expressed in calories per square
centimetre.
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ICfO Ie, I ""'!)3tan .i, bu.1I

TABLE 3. RASGES, IN KIl.OMETRES fRO,", GROUSD-ZUO, AT Wlilell .·IRST- ,..NIl
StCOSD-DEGIll:.£ BURSS WOULD lit. INFLICTtD IIY u:rI.OSIOSS OF VAlliOUS )II,..GSITUDt:! IN THE AT,",OSl'lItR£-

DuluU
IhgTrr of b'H'"

First ·degrce burn
(reddening of skin)
Sccund-dcgrec burn
(blistering of skin)

i~

..... ;T"'" ~'U:h~'~ ~;rrJ"I_

'"

10 .. ,

100 ..,

J All

10 Alr

1.12

3

8.5

22.4

48

08

2,4

6.4

18

38.4

• In the case of surface explosions, the corresponding distancc~ \\ould be
approximately ~ l those for an aerial eXlllosion of the s.1me effectivcncss.
4. Figure XI sho\\s the area olcr which blast and thermal radiation effects
would occur for typical ten-kilot<;OII, "ne-megaton ami ten-mcg:lton explosions in
the atmosphere. \\'ithin the circle in which o\'erpre'<'SUfe amounts to 0.35 kg/cm'
mo~t UOflllal bui«liugs l\"f,uld be compklel) destro~ed. For bilist Ol'efl'reuure of
0.07 kg/em' \\indoll frames, dOllrs and walls would be only s1iglllly damaged.
Within the central lone of heal'~- lbuMgc there \\(.uld be great dauger of fires
and indil'iduals would be expused to effects of nuclea r and therm:11 radiation as
II ell as blast.
I SIT I AI. "t:Cl.t;.\R MAnlATIOS

5. The nudear radiation frOIl1 a nudear explosion, occurring in the atmosphere, may be further eon<idert.'il as consisting of one third initial radiation, i.e.,
IJroduced within a minutc or so of the explosion, and two thirds residual or
delalcd nuclear radiation, i.e., emined O\'er a much longer period of time. The
initial radi:ltion may cause radiati'.n ~ickIJes~ or death in human beings, depending
011 the dose of radiation rccei\'ed ( table 4). A radiation dose of 100 rads' docs
not usually hale harmful consequences for an exposed organi~m. A do~ of 200
r.tds may proouce some blood ch.-mgb while a dose of 1,000 rads \\ill cause illne-s \\ ithin fou r hours :md death within tln1 or three weeks. Doses of 400 to 500
Tads will cause radialion sickm.:,s an,] a 50 pcr cent expectation of death. These
dose estimates ap ply to :I{ule gannna" ralliation; the same effects would be producl'(l by lower doses of neILLrons (sec also t.1b!e 5).
6. The initial nuclear ra(liati"IJ from all explosion in the almosphere abo
tral'els a [oog way in ai r, although Ihe intensity f;llls off fairly rapidly with increasing distance from tin.' eX lllo~ion. Unlike thermal radiation, nuclear radiation
passes easily t hrough most ph) <iral b.1rrieT$. Ilca\'y lalers o[ 1II:1leri:ll$ are
IJcWed to reduce the inten"ily oi nuclear radiation to harmlcss proportions: e.g.,
al a di~tance of 1.5 kilomelru from a OIIe-megaton weapon, burst in the almosIlhere, an individual would need the I'rotectioo o f about 30 cm of steel or 130 em
of concrete to be relal;\'ely safe (rom the effects of initial nuclear radiatioo. 011
Ihe olher hand, allY opaque objl.t such as buildings or protectil'e clothing interposed between the nuclear eXI'I"siun :md exposed ski n would pro\'ide protection
against thermal radiation. T his "uuld remain true elell ir the building llere subsequently destroyed by bla ~t, since the main thermal radiation 1I'0uid have passed
before the arrival of the blast \\:\I'e.
• Rad: A unit of absorbed do~e of radiation; it represents the absorption of
100 erg~ of nuclear (or ionizing) radiation per gramme of the absorbing m;lter ial
or tissue. An erg is a unit of work. It is the work done when a unit rorce of one
dyne moves a body throllgh one centimetre in Ihe directiOll of action flf the force.
"Gamma rOIl S (or radi:ttioIJs) are electromagnetic radia tions of high energy
oTigmaling in atomic nudei and accomlJallying marly nudear reactions for example, fission and radio-activity.
'
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TABLE 4" SU'"t:l4 ... .... Of" CL INICAL E"'"ECTS Of" ACUTE IOS I ZING IlAD IATlON DOSES

1 00 to 1,000 rads"- thcr~peutic r~nr;e (i.e.,
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FU':UIIE XI. ES\'lIlONloIENT"'L V"'III"'TIONS DUE TO BLAST "ND TII£IUIAL R"DI"'TIOS
fOR 10 KT, 1-:-'!T AND 10-MT EXPLOSIONS IN TilE ATWOSPlU!"

10 Mt

1 MI
2

I
1

km

50

4.

3.

*
,.
,1

20

lOki

2

• ,.
,
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10 kt

No
1
2

3

Effects
Second degree burns . . ,
Overpressure 0,07 kG/ cm 2
Overpressure 0.35 kG/cm2

Range
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2.4
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1.6

8.0
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1.2

4.5
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5.

10 Mt

1 MI
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(km)

45
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Area Range Area

(km)

(km 2)
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(km2)

18

1018

243

38.4
19.2
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1158

63.6
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TABLE 5. RANGES, IN KILOMETJ!.ES FROM CROllI'll-ZERO, WITlliN W lIlC lJ AN Al·MOSI'HEJ!.l e ExrLOSJON" W IU. PRODUCE GI\'EN DOSES or INITIA L N"llCLEAR ItALlIATIOS"

Radiation dose
100 rads
500 rads .. ......
1.000 rads

'"

10 AI

100 AI

1 .III

10 MI

1.1 2

1.6

0.96
0.8

I.3
1.12

2.1
1.8
1.6

2.9
2.4
2.24

3.8
3.4
3.2

• Distances for cc;r responding radiation doses would be reouced in Ihe case of
surface explosions.
RF.SID U AL NCCLEAII. IIADIATIOX (~·AI.I.-oU T )

7. Residual or dclayed radiation' arises almost entirely from t he radioactidty of the debris left by the explosion. The proportion o f th is radb t ion may
\'ary according to the Iype of nuclear l\eapon exploded. lIIetoorologic:tl and gral·itational forces cause the bomb debris to be spread widely through the allllosphere
o\'er the countryside. The heavier particles fall close to the scene of the explosion, descending like a mild s;uul-storll1. while th e lighter particles are carr ied
downwind. Both the heavy and light particles contain fuseu fission products and
arc highly radio-actil·e ; they constitU!i: "fall-out'" containing some fl~sion products
which rcmain dangerously radio-active for a relatively short period of time and
some which will remain dangerously radi o-active for many years. The fo rmer
category contributes most of the extcrnal ra(lialion after the initial burst; it also
contributes to internal r<ldiatiOIl Ihrough iodine-131 which when abso rbed in the
body is concent r:lted in the thyroid. In th e second (long-livetl.) category, strontium-90 and eaesium- 137 are the most im po rtan t fission products leading to radio'Iclive contamination of human diets.
8. Relatil·ely local fall-ollt llIay contaminate very extensil·C areas, depending
011 the size of the explosion. the height at \Ihich the explosion takes place. the
wind pattern in the area at the time oj the explosion and rain-out thr ough the
atmosphere (figure XII). Such an arC""d may be of the ord;,r of some fifty square
kilometres for a tw enty-kiloton explosion, near the surface of the earth. In this
case the debris would be I,lrgcly confined to the lower atmosphere and .. oout half
of it would be r('lI1ol"ed, chiefly by rainfall, in a period of abou t three or four
weeks, .. \though some of the particles might circle the earth one or more times
before being deposited. F or an explosion of say tell megatons at the surface of
the e.. rth, intense local fall-out might extend as far as 500-600 km from the
point of the explosion. If such .. n explosion occurred well abol'e the surface of
the earth, a considerable fraction of the debris would be car ried into the stratosphere and. in Ihese circumstances, stolllC debris would reqllire months or evcl1
years to return to earth. By that time a Ilrge proportion of the radi o-active atoms
produced by the explosioll would ha\\~ decayed.
9. In one particular inddent, when a fifteen-megaton device was detonated
in a nuclear test on a coral island, t he resulting fall-out seriously cOI1lOlll1inated an
elongated a rea extending approximately 530 km downwind and varying in width
up to nearly 100 km. In addition, there was a severely contamiuatcd region upwind extending some thir ty ki lometres from lhe point of detona tion. A total area
of some 18,000 sq. km. \\as contamina ted to such an extent thOit survival would
• Some delayed radia tion may arise fr om radio-activi ty produced in ma terials
iu soil or structures as a result of nuelear reacliollS, following the capture o f
ncutrons in such materials. after a nuclear eXI)losion. This is known as inducec.l
XIII shows the estimated exposures that would have been received by individuals,
radio-acti"ity.
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FIGURE XII. TOTAL-EXPOSURE CONTOl1l1S FRO~I EARI.V t'All -OUT AT I , 6 AND 18
HOURS ArrER SURFACE-BURST WITll I -MEG -'ro:.: fi SS ION Ylt:to (24 I.:~I/IIR
ErFECfIVF. WI:':D SPUD). EXl'OSlaF.S I:': IIOES TGE:':S ( R) . O:':E ROESTGE:': OF
C.UI )IA RADIATION CORRESPOSlIS TO TilE ABSORt'TIOS Of ADOUT R7 ERGS I'£R
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have dcpendl'tl on evacuation of the area or taking protective measures. Figure
r~maining unprotected in the open, at \';lriOUS locations ni nety-six hours {ollowing
the explosion. Since an exposure of 700 rads spread O\'~r a pt:riod of ninety·six
hours would probably prove fatal in a majority of cases, it follows tha t, fo r this
particular explosion, there was sufliciellt radio-activity in a downw ind belt of
270 km X 56 kill to ha\'e threatened the lives of nearly all persons who remained
in the area unprotected for at least ninety.six hours, At gr~ter dist.1nces there
would h:l\'e been many cases of sickness resulting in temporary incapacity"
10. Ruidual radiation, liberated by the decay of nuclear debris. may cause
an incr~se of seve ral hund red timt$ the radiation normall}' present as b:lckground
radi;ltion in ;In), area and may seriously inhibit or even prcvent local rescue and
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FIGURE XIII. ESTUIAT[D TOTAL+EXI'OSUIIl!. CO:;roURS I~ 1tO[:;n;[:;s AT 96 HOUU AFTEI TlU; BRAVO TUT I:.XI'I..oSIO:;
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relief operations. Apart from the dirtt t huard of such addi tional radiation to
human Il<!ings, the re is an indirec t hua rd from heavy fall-out contamination of
soil, plant life and water SUlllllies, through subsequent ingestion of contami nated
food supplies. In the incident repo rted in the previous paragraph, t he people
exposed :It l~ongela p, Ilarticularly children, also received high doses of radiation
to the thyroid due to internal radiation from ingested radio-iodine. \ Va ter supplies may well Il<! rendered temporarily unusable. These diret:t and indirect huards
add to the immediate I,hy~ical disaster o f a nuclear explosion by produeing rad iation sickness and death fo r sections of the population who, being on the periphery
of the immediate damage area, would otherwise have appea red to survive the
explosion. In fact the human casualties may be caused at distances where the
immediate physical effects of the explosion are totally absent.
II. It can be calculated that a hypot hetical nuclea r attack of 10,000 megatons
in ground·bursts could, in the course of sixty days, dest roy 80 pu cent of the
IlOpulation of the United States, if unp rotected, while an attack of 2'0,000 megatons could cover the entire country with radio-ac tive fa ll-out, killing 95 per cent
of the unprotccted population. Similarly ill the Soviet Union, wh ich has an area
g reater th:ln tha t of the United States, a 10,000 megaton blow could wipe out
75 per cent of the population. "hereas a 20,000 mcgaton attac k could increase the
population losset to around 90 per cent.

12. Fall-out from nud(.';lr explosions still pro"ides a ma jor contribut ion to
t he radio-aeti\e contamination of our natnral environml'.nt. The ra te at which it
is depos ited Oller the world depends on a number o f fac tors, incl uding t he total
amoun t o f radio-active material rcmailliug in the stratosphere_ Any injection of
nuclear debris into the stratosphere, as a re~u1t of high-yield nucle."l r explosions,
is fo llowed after a period of time by a rise in fall-out rates roughly proportional
to the amoun t injected. In the ab~ence of further atmosflhe ric nuclca.r tes ts, depletion of the 5trato~phcre progressively take~ place and the rate o f fall-out decreases
acco rdingly. The global ra lK of deposition ha\'c been well (Ioc:nmented in a series
of publications by the Uni ted Na tions Scientifi<; Committee on the E ffects o f
Atomic Radiation. T hese relate to studies from the beginning of nuclear tests and
conti nue through the years of public concern about long-term radiation hazards.
beginning with thc intenshe nuclca r weapon testing in the atmosphere in the
19505. and including the intcn<ive atmowher ie testing in 1961/1962, immediately
before the nuclear tes t b~n tre:l ty of 1963. Although that trea ty Stlugh! to Ilrohihit
any furthe r lI uclear weapon testi ng in the atmosphere, some further testing in the
atmosphe re has been enrried out by two countries which did not sign the test ban
treaty. H owever, the Unitcd Na tions Scientific Committee reported in 1966 tha t
the atmo~phe r ic tests in central Asia up to that yea r contributed negligibly to the
risk of rallbtion. as compared with that alrearl)' existing from the pre" ious injection of n\lclC2r debris into the stratosphere.
U!'iOEItWATEk E)( I'I.OSlOl'o'S

13. In explosion under watCT, as ill the case of a nuclear explo<inn in the
atmos])hcTe, a fI re-bail is :lgain formed and the rapid expansion of hot gases
initiate~ a sllock WinoI.'. But the fire-ball is much smaller, and remain~ visible only
until the bubble of con~titl1ent hot high·pre~sure gaseo :IIl!1 ~team reaches the
surf:lce of the water. The shock \\'a\"c C:lUSCS a spray dome to rise over the point
o f burst. \\ilh time of rise and heigh t of dome dC[lCnding on the energy )ield of
the cX]llo~ion ami the ,jl,~th of detonation. Ottails of underwate r nuc1e~ r cxplosions carried out in the Pacific in 1946 aud 1958 are given in annex 111, reference I.
14. Thermal radi:ltion emitted from the fi re-ball while under wale r would Il<'
:lbsorbcd by the surrounding water. 50_ too, i, the initial nuclear radiation although, as soo!! as the fi re-ba ll reaches the surface, gamma radiation from fission
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products in the 113ter column aud the subsequent radio--active cloud acts as initial
nuclear radiation. The waler fall-oul from the cloud, and the "base surge" (spray
rising from water surface), wO\1ld be responsible for delayed or residual nuclear
radiation. Thus, since in this ease the "initial"' nuclea r radiation merges continuously Ilith that prod\lcN o,'er a pc:riod of time, it is less meaniugful to make the
5.1me kind of distinction between initial and residual radiation as applies in the
case of an explosion in the atmosphere.
15. After an underwater nuclear explosion, most of the radio-activity remaining in the water and on the bollom would be found initially in the vicinity of the
explosion. Table 6 shows the rate of spread of radio-active matcri.11 and the
decrease in dose rate, follol\ing the shallow underwater uplosion in the Pacific
in 19-u). For detonations in dl'Cp wate r some activity may be left on the surface
to diffuse rapidly downward and outward, thus reducing the radio-activity level
to safe limits for IlCrSOlmel.
16. Radio-activity falling back from the high airborne cloud on to the sea
extends downward much farther than "base surge" contaminatioll or that transported by the water. The fall-out debris quickly mixes with the water and, since
the water absorbs (or attenuates) the radi;ltion to a considerable u:tent, the
radio--acti,'e haza rd is much less than would result from the same fall-out over
land. The radio-acti ve material is gradually transpor ted to other locations by prevailing currents and, if these are known, the Ilath of the contamillated water can
be predicted.
TABLE 6. D[~[£NS[O~5 AND DOS":' R.\T£ IN OOSTAlIINATt.D WATD .... .-rEI. TnE 20 KT
UNDF.ItW"TER I!XM..OSIOS "T BIKI!'t. 1946

T"'"~ "fIr.
rsrlosio" (haMrs)

.!f~II" d"."'~I~r

IIf conla ", innu,1
lI"a (t'n)

4

7.3

38

7.'

62

86
100
130
200

12.0
13.6
152
18.4

ZO.8

50

MII'>"""'k'" do.e r"I,'
(,"' tor /0,)

3.1
0.42
0.21
0.042

0.025
0.0118

0.00I).I

A nnex II

GENETIC EFFECTS OF NUCLEA II RADIATION
1. It has been established by experiment thl! ionizing radiation c.an induce
changes in hereditary nt.1terial in plants, in animals and in humau beings. Such
changes fall into two broad categories: first, geue mutations, eOllsisting of
I:hangcs in single genes, which are the elementary units of information that form
the genetic "message" transmitted by each ])arent to offspring through the germ
cells; 5«ondly, gross chromosome anomalies which are due to loss, duplication or
re~arrangement of major or mino r parts of the chromosomes in which the genes
are I:ootained and thus involve whole bllX.ks of the elemcT1lary wlits that make
up the genetic "message". It must be noted that simila r gelletic changes t.1n also
IX.cur spolltancously in humln and other species.
2. Geneticists agree that the overwhelming majority of Ilt:ldy occurring
genetic chauges. II helher spontaneous or ind uced by radiation or any other agent,
3re detrimcntal. Individuals I:arr)ing the affected genes or chromosomes It.we a
reduced chance of transmitting their genetic "message" bcc.1use of reduced fertility
or redu ced likelihood of survival. Eventuall y these gelletic 1:h.1nges will thus be
eliminated from the population. Some of them may result in barely noticeable
social consequences as when an immature germ I:ell is lost or a fertilized egg fails
to implant. But other changes may causc serious hardship for ooth an individual
:\1ld society i£ tht:)' a ffect the normal developmental p:lItcrns in noticeable "":1)'5
and lead to such damage as mental deficiency or a major physical disability.
3. Since most of the sllOnt.1neous mutations in mau are bt:licl'ed to be eliminated during the development of either the germ cells or the em bryo, they cannot
readily be detected; but it has been possible to obsene the frequencies of a number of dominant hereditary traits which m:llIifcst themselves in the offspring of
thc individuals who transmit the al tered genes, and to estimate the relevant mutation ralcs. The f requencies of certain spont.1neously occurring chromosome anOIllaliu associa ted with mental and physic:ll tldeets are also known. ~Iost of these
defects are the results of challges which took place in the ge rm cells of the
parents of the affected indh'iduals.
4. No dirtl't informatiun is currently available on the rate of radiation-induction of gene mutations in man. Estimates of the genctic risks arising from
ionizing radiation, howeve r, can be base.1 on resul ts of experiments Oil animals,
particularly mice or, in the case of chromOllOme anomalies. on studies Idth tissue
cultures of human skin and blood exposed to radiation. EXllCrimcnts on mice confi rm results of experiments with lower organi ~ms in shOll ing that the )icld of
gene mutations is directly proportional to the radiation dose. T hey also show that
the yield per unit dose is lowcr when the dOM! is delil'ered over a long period of
time than whcll deli vered instantly. While these experimenb have made it possible
to describe the rnutatiollai effects of irrad iat ion, they do not provide adequate evidence that could be applied to man, regarding the manner or ratc IIith which
indoced gene mutations would be eliminated from the populatioll, or thc proportion of mutations th.1 t IIould have serious eonscqut'111:~. It is not, therefore, IIOSsible to assess how many, say, crippled or mentally defective individuals would
appear in any generation descended frOIll irradiated individu3ls, ami the total
numbe r summed o\'er all gene rations is also highly uncertain. The limitatiolls of
the t! xperimenU, 3nd the assumptions made, lead to widely ranging Iluantitative
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cstim:ltes of the frequency of possible defects in offspring. Except for Ihe pnrpose of ruling out some of Ihe mos t extreme possibilities, these estim:ltes arc of
limited value and are, thereforc, not included here.
5. Unlike gene mutations, radi:ltion-induced chromosome anomal ies have becn
directly observed in body tissues of irradiated hum;\n beings. They have also
bee.n studied in a wide numbe r of plant and animal species. including mice and
monkeys where they have been directly observed in immalme germ cells. Again.
as for genc mutations, the yield of cJlromosome anomalks depends on the radiation dose but the relationship between dosc ;Uld frequenc)' of anomalies is more
complicated than for gene mtllatiolls and, where low doses ;'Ire involved, is less
well known. On the basis of somewhat arbitrary assumptions. it is possible to
obtain quan ti talive estimatcs of tIle rate of induction by radiation of a few types
of chromosome anomalies known to be :lssociated with certain severe physical
and mental defects in man, but how much weight could be attached to such estimates is uncertain. More important, not hing is known about the likely ratts of
induction of other, more commOI!, chromosome anomalies which, in IlOIl-irradiatcd
populations, arc present in, :lnd seriously affect, about I per cent of a11 live-born
chil~reo. and are also responsible for about 4 per cent of all spontaneous miscarnages.
6. Most of the known defects :lssodatccl Ilith chromosome anomalies a re so
severe as to preclude reproduction of the individuals IIho are affected. A large
fraction of the induced chromosome anomalies can, therefore, be expected to involve at most the immediate, first-generation offspring of the individuals io which
they have arisen.
7. In general, the long-term genetic effects of nuelear radiation in living
otg:lnisms are cumulative. \Vhile no visible injury would accompany the induction
of genetic changes in the exposed individual~. wldesirable consequences would
arise in Sllcceeding generations until the changes wcre eliminated from the IIOPUration by thei r OWl! detriment. Study of the effect of massil'e radiation. 011 a specific pollUlation, requires a thorough allal)'5is of Ihc relationship between the doses
delivered and the frequencies of the changes produced. It also d<:ll1ands a global
evaluation o f the social as well as the biological consequences of \.hese effects.
L."Ick of information 011 radio-genetics, together Idth uncertainty about the :lmount
of radiation to which a population would be exposed in any given nuclear war,
makes calculations about genctic damage very unreliable. But it is rC:tsonably
certain that a population which had been irr:ldiated at an intensity sunicient to
kill C\'en a few per cent of its members, would suffer imporl:lnt long-term consequences.
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BASIC COSTS OF NUCLEAII WA III IEAIlS
FI SS IONABI.E MATERIALS

I. T he three materials suitable for the application as a nuclear explosive are
uranium-235, plutoniulll-239 and uranium·233. They all possess Ihe main properties
required, i.e., long half-life, a sufficient high probabi lity for fission and low probabili ty for spontaneous fission. Uranium-233 is not known to ha ve been used in
nuclear explosives, and the cost of this mate rial has thcrefore not been considered here.

2. Natural urallium contai ns 0.7 per cent o f uranium-235 whilc the main
component is uranium-238. For use as a nuclear explosil'e the uranium·235 is
usual1y enriched to 90·95 ptr cent. Scveral processes, i.e., gaseous diffusion, thermal diffusion ami electromagnetic separation, hal'e been developed for this purpose.
Of these, only the gaseous diffusion process is known to be applied :\t present.
Thermal diffusion and electromagnetic separation "ere used for developing the
first Uni ted States nuclear weapons, but both processes wcrc abandoned aftcr the
Se<:ond World \Var because of high co>t". The total Uniled States investments
in these two methods have been around $US 460 million (I) .•
3. Thc gas centrifuge, which may pro,·e to be a useful separation tool, is
still at the developm('ntal stage.
4. The gaseous diffusion process is uscd today in France, the United Ki ngdom, the United Slates alld is believed to be used also in the USSR and China.
This method il1yoh'es some 4,000 enrichment stages aud large aud costly plants
based on advanced technology are required. The exact technology is largely
classified. The USAEC operates today three such plants. The cost of the first
plallt was arotmd $1,000 million, and of the t wo subsequent plants a total of
$1,300 million, and it has been as'lImed th:ll the cost of one such plant of economic size is in the range of S750 million to $1,000 million (2).
5. The capacity of thcse three plants has recently been publishcd by thc
USAEC." In terms of scparative c;l.]);l.city for producing highly enriched uranium235 the total was <loout 17 million kil ogrammes per year of uatural uranium feed
for the qu oted 0.2531 per cent UT:lnium-235 content of the depleted residue. If the
yearly operating costs amount to $500·600 million the corresponding cost in terms
of separati,·c wo rk units (i.e., per kg of natural ur<lnium fced for light enrichment and Ihe quoted depl('(ion) is about $30 to $35 per kg 111Iit.
6. The uranium·235 product is 4.5 grammes per kg of natural uranium and
the separative work cost is $6,700 to $7,800 ]ler kg uranium-235, or a tolal cost
of $11,000 to $12.000 per kg U·235 from natural uranium at $ZO ]ltr kg. Th('se
cost estimates are in agreement lIith a statement made by the Forum Study Committee on T oll Enrichment (3 ) that the separative costs in new United States
• Figures in parenthcses arc refcrcnc('s to documents in the li,t appended to
this annex.
a USAEC press rc!use, 14 June 1967.
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diffusion plants need not exceed $30 per kg of separative work in the years to
come, whether these plants are owned privately or by the USAEC.
7. Some t w~n ty-five kil ogrammes of weapons-grade uranium would be reo
qu ired for the production of one nuclear warhead with a yield in the twentykiloton range (4) . Uranium-Z35 is preferred over plutonium for the production
of thermonuclea r weapons.
8. The gas centri fuge would on the other hand be suitable for producing
small quantities of uranium-ZJ5. H owC\ler, Ihe current technology has been classi·
fied by most countries conductillg centrifuge research, and up-to-date information
regarding the status of the technolog}' and costs beyond those rel:aed to the orig inal Zippe machine (5) a re therefore sparse. A plant capable of producing fifty
kilogrammes of 9O-per-cenl enriched uranium-Z35 per year would, according to
this in form ation (5) , cost around $130 million and have annual operating costs
of about $13 million. With !O per cent annual in\·cstment charge the production
costs would amount to $500,000 per kg uranium-Z35.
P LUTONIUM-ZJ9
9. Plutonium-2J9 is produced in a nuclear reactor when the uranium-2J8 contained in the fuel elements is subjected to neut ron flux . Other, non-fissile plutonium isotopes, par ticularly pluton ium-240, are produced simultaneously, and tlle
relative fraction of such isotopes increases with the irradiation t ime. Tn weaponsgrade ))ll1tonium the non-fissile fraction should be 10 per cent or preferably less,
and this necessitates fuel burn-ups below about 1,000 MWd/tU. For comparison it
should be mentioned tha t the fuel bUrn-UI) in na tural uranium powcr reactors is
an order of magnitude highe r.

10. It is estimated that sOllie eight kilogrammes of 95 per cent plutonium-Z39
IlouM be req uired for the construction of one nuclear warhead wit h a yield
around 20 kilotons (4).
II. A complete p!uloniun!-239 production complex wou ld require a uranium
refinery (alld evcntually a metals ingot plant ), a fuel fabrication plant, a reactor,
a plutonium extraction plan t, a plutonium metals reduction 1)lant alld related
service facilities.

12. The costs of a complex designed fo r integrated production of some eight
kilogrammes ( 95 per cellt) plutonium-2J9 per yea r and concentrated around a
40-50 !\{Wth heavy water cooled and moderated reactor with a throughput of 20
tons metallic na tural fuel per year can be estimated as follows ( table I ):
T.~DLE

I. PRODUCTION

COSTS FOil _

8

KG WEAPOSS -GII.ADE PLUTO N I U M PER VF.AII

(In SUS millions)
A",,,,(1.1

Capitul
costs

ol'~rotj"iI

Refinery and metals ingot plant .......
Fuel and fuel fab rication ..... ........
Rea ctor .... ... ....... .. ......
PlutoniulII extraction
... ... ....
Plutoniull1 fabrication
Sen·icc farilitie s .... .........

2.50
1.50
10.00
1.25
0.25
6.50

1.75
0.60
1.20
0. 17
0.18
0.87

GIl.AND TOTA L

ZZOO

_ 4.80

T he reactor capital and op~rating costs are based
Canadian reactor NRX (9).
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cos"

011

R.I.
(6)

(7)
(8)
(8)
(8)

in formation concerning the

13. Because of the small quantities involved, the plutonium recovery costs
have ~en based on a batdl ion cxch;mge process and not on the COIII"elitional,
continu ous solvent extraction process emploYf'd for large-scale operation.
14. A Swedish study made for the purpose of this rf'port concerning the cost
of producing 40/80/160 kg of weapons-grade plutonium-239 pe r yror has been
ca rried out (4). Plutoni um production reactors in the power range 250-500 ~IWth
and a 350 :;... IWth power reactor have been considered, assuming th at the reactors
were to be moderated with heavy water and fuelled wilh natural uranium. The
plutonium production reactor fuel clements arf' made up of metallic uranium rods
dad in aluminium and the power production reactor is fuelled with uranium dioxide pellets clad in Zircaloy-2. The study docs not include investments in facili ties
for uranium ore milling and concentration and is therefore based on a price of
$8 per pound of the concentrate (UsOs) bought on the open market. It has been
assumed that refuclling of the reactors can be carried out on-load. Table 2 below
coven the power reactor alternative, and table 3 the plutonium production reacto r
alternative.
TABI.E 2. PROIIUCTION COSTS FOR 40 AND 80 KC OF Wf.... l'QSS-<:RADF. PI.UTONIUM
!'Elt YEAR IN A J50 M\VTII I'()WER REAcrQlt
(Ill $US milliolls)

Cal'il..1

A .... w.1

C"IU

COIU

8.0

6.0

\ 5.0

1.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

32.0

4.0

12.0

39.0

21.0

fucl, conversion and fucl elemen t
5.0
plant ........................•...
Reactor (additiona l costs, not needed
for power) ......................
1.0
Reproc cssing and plutonium com·cr28.0
siol!
GRAND TOTAl. 34.0

T AUl.E 3. PItQDUCTIOS COSTS FOR 80 ANI) 160 KG OF WE:AI'OSS·(;RADF. PI.UTONIUM
P.l:H I'KAR IS PROD UCTION REACTORS
(1" SUS millimu )
Rnull)f'

Ii~t:

PI~I"~;"m pr6d"rt;<>~:

250 AI"'I},

500 MWII,

80

160

Capllal

,,,.1$

f uel, conversion and fuel element
plant
4.0
React or
33.0
Reprocessing and plutonium conver36.0
sion
............. 4.0
Miscdl:IllCOU5

............................
......................
..... .............. ..........
.........

GRANI) TOTAl. 17.0

ko/,rn~

k/1/,r~~

A~Nual

Catl·,.1

A~""al

CMU

CQ'U

CDSt.

2.5

5.0

3.7

1.4

38.0

1.8

.1.5

40.0

4.0

4.0
7.4

87.0

9.5

15. The costs o f producing weapons-g rad e plutonium in a small frac tion of
the core of a 600 MWe powe r reactor of the CANDU·tYIlC using standard fuel
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elements have also been considered, on the assumption that the cost of elcctrieity
production should !)( independent of the plulOniull1 production, i.e., as if the complete core comprised fud elements }idding maximum burn-up. This means lb. t
the reactor operating costs related to ]"Iutoniulll production would be prollOriional
to the costs of plutonium-producing fuel elements at least in the low quantity
range, say 8-40 kg of weapons-grade plutol1illl1\ per year. It has also been assumed
that a throughput of fue l corrl'silonding to two tons of U per )ear with a bum-up
around 600 :\!\\'<V"IU would be required 10 produce oot" kg of weapons-grade
plutonium. The calculations h:.we furthcr bcal based on 6,000 hrs reactor operati on per year ami costs of fue l and fuel clement production of $72.50 per kg U
contained. The resulting cost of plutonium before reprocessing would be $133,000
per kg. T.king reprocessing costs in ti,e Swedish study (4), i.e., $70 per kg U,
the cosu of $270,000 per kg wcapons-grade plutonium would result.
16. Table 4 summarizes our results concernillg plutonium I'roouctioll. In
figure XIV the tosts pe r kg are shown as a function of the production capacity.

TABl£ 4. METAUIC

WI:APOss-c ..... O£ PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION

rosTS

(In JUS millions)
PlwIQ"i.....
e,ul4

(lO,rru"l
PN>d"ct;Q"
ClIPlItlly.

Irq I'M /yn r

8

............

10-SO ... , .... . ...

40
80
80

160

....... .....
............
............
............

C_/'i,"1

N~",,''" Vt~

ro,,,

""" MI /I.

Production (SO)
Power (600 MWe)
Power (350)
Power (JSO)
Production (250)
Produclion (500)

O,r,"I;"q
CQ,,.
(~~~

y",r)

22.00

4.80

34.00
39.00

12.00
21.00
7.40
9.50

77.00
87.00

u" .. 41

,,,,,ul"'~'"

chlI~q~)

(, ... Irq)

0.90
0.27
0.39
0.31
0.19
0.1 2

17. From the dat. arrived at for the costs of gaseous diffusion, and production of plutonium-2J9, and in view of the lack of reliable data concerning gas
centrifuge costs, il would seem Ihat a count ry desiring to build one or a minor
numbe r of nuclear warheads IlCr year would go for the plutonium type.
18. A sma!! programme, aiming .t Ihe production over a ten-YC!ar IlCr iod of
ten warheads, each with a yield of about twenty kilotons, .... auld require a total of
80 kg plutonium. The corresponding tOlal plutonium IlfOCllremOlt costs based on
a SO kWth producti on reactor would comprise some $22 million in callilal costs
and around $48 million for ollCration, altogether, Le., $7 milliun per year, or
approximately $0.9 million per kg of plutonium.
19. If an equivalent quantity of plutonium was 10 be produced in conjunction
with electricity production ill a large (600 M\Ve) power reactor, the cor resJlonding
total costs would amount to some $22 million, i.e., $2.2 million IlCr ye."lr, or :lround
$0.27 million per kg of plutonium.
ZO. A moderate prog ramme, aiming at the production over a ten-year pe riod
of 100 nuclear warheads of the same si:te :15 abo\(, would, based on a 250 MWth
production reactor with an output of 80 kg plutonium per year, invohe total costs
of $151 million, of which $77 milliOIl would be capital costs and $74 million
operating costs. The corresponding annual costs would be $15 million and the
plutonium costs $0.19 million pe r kg. Doubling the production capacity to 160 kg
per year aiming at the procurement of ZOO warheads over a ten-year peri od would
result in capital and operating costs of $87 million and $95 million respectively.
The annual costs would be $19 million and the plutonium production costs
$0.12 million per kg.
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Flr.ua£ XIV.
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/
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.J...

"''''''

"""'I(

.

,

"

'"

Produc:tion c~ity, kg Pu pe'YOI'

21. From figure XIV it can be seen that plutonium production based on a
large power reactor would be fa r more expensil'e when the production rate is
increased.
DESIGNING AND MANurACTUalNG

22. The amount of published infonnation on problems related 10 wa rhead
assembly is scverely limited by military secrecy. Some very general evaluations
of the nature of the problem can, howe,·er. be made. Bomb construction includes
slIch activities as detailed measurements of bomb material properties, weapOIlS
design, fina l metallurgic.l1 treatment of explosi\'t$, manufacture of fusing and
detollation equipment, etc. The fabri cation of plutonium bombs is complicated by
se\'eral factors, such as complex metallurgy, toxicity and chemical reactil'ity of
Ihe metallic charge. In addition, the design and construction of shaped charges
for explosion detonation presumably represent challenging problems. I Iowever,
various countries possess this technology since slliltlCd charges arc used in such
weapons as the bazooka and for perforators, oil'\\I';1I casings and open hearth
furnace tappers.
23. According to one source ( 10) t he cost of assembling from two to three
bombs per year would comprise some $10 million in tal)ital investments and anllual
operating COSt5 of some $5 million. According to the more recent Swedish study
(4) the capital in\'estments in a factory for assembling ten ....·arheads per year
would be about $8 million and the anllual operating costs around $1 rniJ1ion. The
Swedish figllres have been used in assessing the total costs gi\ell in the section 011
various wa rhead production programmes below.
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TESTI NG

24. \Vithoul knO\\ing the completc requirements that a counlfy considering a
first nuclear lest migh t Ie,,}, on t he test Ilrogramme, the cost of tests can only he
a~se$sed in a most general manner.
23. The factors a country conducting a fi rst lIucltar tts t Illight consider arc:
(Q) The en"ironment of the test, i.e., above the earth's surface, on the surface, undtrground or under water;
(b) The diagnostics of Ihe explosion;
( c) The weapons-clTccts tests to be made.
26. Tests at or ncar the earth's surface (balloon- or to\\er-susrended, freefall or rocket-launched) would prO\'ide the greatest amount of dala for the lowe~t
cost. The absolute cosls would, however, depend largely on the comple"ity of Ihe
e"pcriments performed, the cost of accommodations and the number of l>col,le
involved, and "ould therefore be difficult to state.
27. A nation signatory to the limited test-ban treaty would be constrained to
testing underground, either in a hole drilled for the purpose, or in a mine. A fe w
e"amples of costs involved in connexion with such tests will be given below.
28. A tcst " ith a ZO-kiloton bomb would rC<lui re a dr illed hole 1,100 feet deep
and 90 inches in diametcr. United States costs for such a hole in dry tuff would
be some $0.35 million. Drilling under other conditions could easily double the
cosu. Costs for sealing to pre\'ent venting would ha,'e to be added. Few countries,
ho\\e\'er, are known to ha\'e digging equipment for deep holes with this diameter.
T he simplcst diagnostic test a country could conduct for an underground t~t
would be to get a crude determination of yield. A determ ination good to about
± 40 per cent can be obtained by using surface seismometers in the vicinity of
zero-ground, and would cost a few thous:md dollars. A determination to about
± 20 pe r cent can be obtaiued by digging a series of holes C:o\tending radially outward from the device hole for the installa tion of accelerometers and seismometers.
The determina tion would in this case cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.
29. The best yield determ ination could be obtained by d ri11ing back to the
dcinity of the e" plosion and performing radio-chemical analyses of device debris.
This procedure could easily be as vc.pensi\e as drilling the original hole.
30. The Lo ng Shot eH!n t, conducted at Amchitka Island in 1965 for seismological calibration of the Aleutian chain area, is a good example of the basic costs
(exclusi\e of the explosion de\ ice) for such tes ts carried out in a remote area.
The costs are broken down in table 5.
T ARI.I: 5.

COST

01'

TIIY.

Los(: SHOT

EVt:ST

(In SUS miliiOtJS)
EXIII'1ratory "ork to d( tennine the feasibility of using the arca...
E~tabli'hing the base .................................. ........
Drilling and scaling ...............................
Em plaeing cquipm~nl in the hole......................... .
Ali other expenditu res. ................. .... .... ...........

2.61
4.50
1.87
0.16
1.52

31. For comparison, it could be menti"ned that the USAEC l\e\'ada lest site
represents an im-estment of $150 million, :md that AEC for the period I Ju[y
1963 to 30 June 1966 spent abou t $200 million for underground testing, exclusive
of the cost of the fissionah le mate rialuscd.
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32. It would prcsumably be cheaper to conduct the tl:$t in an established mine
linle new digging and construction would be required for sub-shafts and
zero room. The gaugcs for device diagnostics would be installed in the zero room
enclosure. D<:vicc yidd measurements t."ln be made by gauges installed in the drift
mined for dcvice emlliacemelll. T he yield would be determined by hydrodynamic
measurements. A minimal amount of diagnostic or dc\"ice Ilcsign and operation
information can be obtained by r~o rdi ng the rate of rdease of energy from the
device, i.e., the "Alpha". T he costs of a test conducted in a mine have been esti
mated as shO\\ n in taMe 6.
~ince

T ABL[

6.

(.(1ST OF "S UND[Rr;;lQU;';O WU.!'O;';S n:ST ,·r..aroltl.l[O IS AN I SE

(fl. US doli/IrS)

Access ............... ... ............ .. ...... . ............ .
Headframe excnvalion and installation ............ .... ..... .
Shaft and /Iri ft complex ... .......... .... ... ....... ....... .
Zero room .......... ........ ........................ .. ... .
Instrumentation in~tal1ation and oper.ttion . .... . ............ .
Timing and fi ring inSlill1ation and ollCration ............... .
Iftviee installation ................................. .
Sternmillg ................................................ .
Technical direction ........................................ .
Administrat ion .......................•....................
GlASD TOT,\I.

70,000
130,000

1,156,000

60,000
55,000
50,000
10,000

400,000
90,000
160,000
2,182,000

33. These costs arc exclushe of the de" ice itsel f, the instrumentation recording equipment and the timing and firing system, and arc based on costs for simi·
lar type construction at the United States Kevada Test Sitc.
34. According to Swedish estimates (4), the total COSU of testing one 20kiloton d~vice unde rground would ~ mount to $12 million, and the costs of testing
four such del'ices would amount to $15 million.
35. According to the costs of the Long Shot event (table 5) and the ahove
cost estimate for a test performed in a millc, the Swedish cost estimate may \I ell
be a realistic onc.
Cosrs

rOil VAII.IOI'S W"IIIlUD l'ItODI'CTIOS rJlOGRAMMES

Plrl/onium

~l"o,h r(ld

protilfclion proyr(lfflmt

36. BaSCI\ on tire estimated cost figures for plutonium ])roduction and warhead
desig'n, manuf;.etllre and testing ghen aho\e, the total costs of a small programme
(one 2O-kiloton warhead per year Oler ten ye:lTs) and a modera te programme (ten
2O-kiloton warheads per yea r Ol'er ten yea rs) arc shown in table 7. The small
programme wOlild cost $11 million ]JoCr yea r, i.e., $11 million per warhead, whereas
the moderate pr ogramme would cost $20 million per yea r, resulting in a warhead
unit price of $2 million. If the small programme could be combined l\ltlt plutonium
production in a large flOwer reactor, the annual costs might he reduced to
$6 million, and consequently the warhead unit costs to $6 million.
Production programmt inr/wding thtnn onuc/tor warlrtods
37. The. escalation of the total warheads production costs resulting from the
constru ction and operation of a diffusion plant for enriching uranium-2J5 and
the development and !tSling of thermonuclear weapons is well demonstrated in the
French examplc shown in table 8. The gaseous diiJusioll plant was built aftcr 1960.
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TABl.E 8. COSTS OF TOTAl. PR£SCU

NUCI..EAR W ,\RnEADS PROGRAMME-

(In SUS mil/ions)
Filli/r
malrriDi

T o 1960 ..... .
1960·1964 .......... . .
1965-1970

880

GRASD T<1fAI.

I ,O~O

160

40

(to 1964)

Tt~li"g

TOIDI

40

240
I,""

460
300
Details not specified __""_
500
340
(to 19(4 )
(to 19(4)

3,180

5,060

• It is expected that costs will stabilize a fter 1970. The figures are taken from
ref. (11).
CoSTS

or OJ;!.IVEll:V

~"EIIICI.r.s

G(lIlrol (Qllside,.otioIlS

38. The basic premise taken herein is that nuclear forces are created to
achieve military and political objectives which require the force to be credible and
effective. Thus the costs of approaches employing weapons ass('mb1ed and hidden
on enemy territory, delive red by ship or by commercial ai rcraft or other unortho·
dox means of delivery are ruled out. Consideration is therefore limited to nuclear·
capable military bombcr aircraft or ballistic missile forces which can playa
"strategic" role. In addition to the delil'ery vehicles PI'''' Sl!, there must be created
the necessary bases; launching sites; supporting syst('ms (maintellance, logistics,
defence etc.); and command, control and communications system, to establish a
force of military and political value which is safe from unauthorized or accidental
employment.
39. Range rt'(luiremCllts, together with th(' physical characteristics of the
nuclea r weapon, will affect the size of the delh-ery vehicle (i.e., relatively sm:li1
:lnd sophisticated I\e:lpons for small vehicles). The characteristics of the adversary's targets and the na ture of the defences employed to pr<>lect them will play
an important part in determining the type of force and the requi red accuracy of
,,-capon delivery. Early warning systems would have to be prodded for these
nuclear forces, backed up by :lnti·aircraft defences, interceptors, dispersed air·
fie lds etc., for a bombe r neet, and h3rdening or mobility for missiles.
40. I n formu lating the costs for a proposed programme the cost of acqllisitioll
of the delive ry systems, the costs of all of the related support systems discussed
abO\'e, and the costs of oper:ltion and maillt\!nance ought to he included. In the
case of bombers, supporting equipmc-nt and facilities, including airfields, refuelling
planes, large maint('nance and ol·erhaul dellots, etc.. are neetk'd. In the case of
missiles, launch, overhaul and mainteuance facilities are required. Missile launching
submarines require their own supporting fac ilities, including shipyards and/o r
tenders. It is possible 10 have the relatively low acquisition costs obtained th rough
purchasing old aircraft offset by higher operating costs. ~lissile system operating
costs, which are lower than aircraft, are offset by the generally higher acquisition
cost.
41. From another standpoint, there are also the costs needed to maintain Ihe
effectivencss of the force in light of its obsolescence, caused in part by counter·
measures triggered by its deployment. The latter costs can consist of extensive
modernization costs of the deployment vehicles, such as ad:ql\ing aircraft to cope
with an adversary's air defence, or the replacement of the force by succeeding
generations of de livcry vehicles.
42. The accuracy with which delivery vehicle costs are predicted has bef,n
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notoriously poor. Heavy overruns of tlCpenditures have been the rule rather than
the tlCccption, and have been concurrent \lith lengthy delays in Ihe projected
time tables. Many instances exist of the deployment of extremely costly but
already obsolescent weapons systems, which we re \lithdrawn a vc ry short time
after thcir initial deployment. Furthermore, while it is not always correct, it can
be gene rally assumed that the accu racy of cost and time est imates for hoth the
developmen t and production of delivery \'ehicles is a fun ction of prior related
experience. O\'errunS are therefore more likely to be incurred \lhen a country
embarks on its first generation development.
43. The lime needed to develop a delivery system depends 011 the existi ng
industrial base and related experience, and would. in most caSl!S, take at least ten
years fo r reasonably industrialil:oo nations. Costs can be spread over time, but
peaks occur at certain points, Obsolescence and countermeasures costs are related
to the time factor.
44, Mone!.1 ry costs do not, by themselves, give a realistic picture of the
necess.1ry effort in terms of over-all resources. A siZ<lble tecl1ll010gical base is
needed to create and maintain a force of delh-cry w:hicles. Included here are the
necessary skilled workers, engin('Crs, scientists and managers, fabricat ing facilities,
exlltrimental facilities, test ranges, etc. Even if major components Com be purchased abroad, the delivery system must be integrated into a workable whole, and
this process requires \lIe skills of a large number of Qualific:d ~ rsons.
45. Licensed production abroad tend! to increase costs because of language
and measu remcnt standards, translation, Ira\'el time, labour unfamiliarity with
advanced teclul0logical Ilrocesses, royalty payments, small production rUIIs and lack
of cstablished industry \I ith its t ools and labour skills.
46. It should be noted that the F rench and Unitc:d Kingdom programmes
a re aimed at the tstablishmen t of a credible modern force ; while thcy are sm,,]]
COmllared to the Uni ted States effort, they are nevertheless judged by responsi ble
officials in those countries as providing the lower limit of a suitable strategic
nuclea r force. The Uni ted States expenditures in this field represent fin effort in
order of magnitude costlier than the combined United Kingd om- French programmes. This is due to hat h the preponderantly large r United States forcc
invoh'ed and the much longcr time ~riod this force has been in ex istcnce. The
o\'C!'·alJ delivery vehicle cxpenditures for these three nations are estimated as:
France ( 1960-1970)-$2.780 million; United Kingdom ( 1956-1967)-$4,107 million ;
and United States ( 1948· 19iO)-$1 10,5OO million. Undoubtedly. leu ex~nsh'e
prog r.Jmmes can be envis.1ged for other countries in other circumstances. However,
in general, even a modest indigenous delivery vehicle programme including nuclear
'I capons would entail expenditures of no less than $1,500 million.
47. Many natiOIiS :Ilready have a present or easily reali ~able delh'ery vehicle
capability of some sort, such as ag ing bomhcrs, short-rangc figh ter·bombers and
la rge space rockets, Howcver, given plausible interest in deploying credible forccs
coupled \\ ilh Ihe strategic req uirements at hand, few of thcse nati"lIs actuall y ha\'e
an acceptable nuclea r delhery \'ehicle (12) ,
COSTS OF ELEMENTAllY DI!LI\'EItV S\' STEMS

Aircraft
48, The 101\est level of expcnditure for such a system could be achic\·ed
th rough, say, purchasing a force of th irty to fifty Canber ra, B·57, or similar
bombers, This type of aircraft can carry nuclear weapons, although unrduelled
range is limited.
49. Tilt acquisition aud operating costs of such a system halc been esti·
matcd flS follows (in millions of US dollan) ( 13):
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ACq""',·I'dll
C~II~

A~''''dl

dpnlU'''/I
t,.ls

Aircraft, spares, tankers and related tqu ipment. .....
P rotection; dispersed basing, simple pent:tr.ltion aids,
fighters and a.llti-ain;:raft ....................... .

120

IS

60

10

T OTAL

180

25

SO. As an example of production costs, a B-29 propelleT·(lriven bomber produced ill the United States costs $1.2 million plus an almost equivalent value of
governmen t material ( 14).

Missiln

51. An elementary surface- ta-su rfaee missile force can be cOllsidered to consist of approx imately fifty short-range or intermediate-range missiles in soft
emplacements. Such an elemenlar), force is likely to have low reliabilit), and could
probably only launch a small fraction of its missiles in a co-ordin:ltcd atl..ek
Since it is unlikt;ly that a missile force can be purchased at preWlt, indigenous
development would be rc<]uired even if certai n major compouents such as the
boosters migh t be purchased. Guidance and control of the boosler is required in
order to make the missile a credible strategic threat; the developmcnt of these
s)'stems is considered the most critical and expensive (IS). A typical industrialized
nation mig ht spend from eight to ten years on such a programme (1 5).
52. The acquisition and operating costs of such systems with missile ranges
of 500 and 1,500 n.mi., respecti vely, have bttn estimated as follows (in millions
of US dollars) :
Aeq .. i';ti.,.

Missiles, including da'dopment, procuremerot
and 50 ft sites deployment (16) ............
Protection . . ............
TOTAl.

tNl,

A .... ..,1 ol'ndli"g

$/111 ...... ;
'._/It

1,5/1/1 .....,;.
'~~/I~

5011 .. ... ,
' ._/It

400·500

745-860

5

4.

4•

440-540

785-900

5

CO"~

1.500 ......i.
~d"/1t

I.
I.

53. The United States Thor is an example of an carly strategic missile programme. T his 1,500 n.mi.-range missile was deployed at soft sites in tht: United
Kingdom for sc,"eral years. The C051 of developmen t was somew~ t lower than
normal, since the Thor shared several of ils systems with the Atlas missile in
that the propulsion systems were very similar, and the Thor re·tntry vehiclt'$ were
identical with the carly Atlas re·entry \·ehicles. T he total costs of the programme
have been estim.1.ted at $600 million (16).
54. The British Blue Streak programme was comparable to the Thor in that
it was a soft-based liquid propell:lnt missile. Tilt: Blue St re1k had a design range
of 2.500 n.mi. Due to ti me· tab le sliPllages, COSI overruns amI Ihe recognized obsolescence and vulnerability of soft basing and slo\1 re action time, the Blue S treak
was cancelled during its development, after approximate expenditures of $300 million ( 17, 18). It was estimatcd that an add itional $1,700 million would have been
expended to complete its development and to deploy a force from soft sites in over
eleven years (18, 19). British missile costs have on several occasions escalated and
resulted in programme cancellations (20,21, 22).
S5. The total acq uisition cost for a force of
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thi rl ~

Atlas SQuadrons with

some 140 misSIlu .... ith launch facilities IS estimated at $4,900 million (23). Th is
is about $35 million per missile. Resources requi red in terms of capital investmen t
for production and cOIl ~t ruction alone is about $153 million IJer squadron after
delelopment is completed (24). The cost of an Atlas missile vehicle wi thout warheads is $1.9 milliOn (23). A soft Atlas launch facility costs Ol'cr $..77 million,
and establishment of Ihe facility involvcd a massive complex industrial effor l
lasting some 1110 yean (25). Eac h Atlas costs $1 million per yea r to mai ntain,
with eighty trained mcn to support every missile (26).
CosTS OF MEDIUM-LEV1tL DELI VEItV SYSTEMS

A ircraf t
56. A medium-le~ tI aircraft del ivery system can be considered to consist of a
force of high perfor mance aircraft, willi thei r rela ted tankcrs, bases, ma imenance
facilitics, command and tOTltrol system, etc. T he French Mirage I V A bomber
system i~ an cxample of such a force. The ai rcraft was an outgro .... th of a Mirage
fig hte r of Ihe mid-1950s, took more than six years to develop and deploy, and
will be: 11hased Otlt by b<llIislic missiles in the: 1970s. The total aowisition costs are
exp«ted to be around $940 million, and the annual operating costs around
$100 million (II). The lotal costs of the Mirage force including operation over
ten year! could therefore he closc to $2,000 million.
57. T he British V-bomber fo rce, comprising three models of suhsollic medium
bombers is another example of medium-level airc raft del ivery systems. Approxima tely 300 bombers wcre built of which probably less t han 200 .... ere operational at
anyone time. A prolJOrtioll of the force is equipped Idth the Blue Steel ai r_tosurface missile. T he total acquisition tosts hale ~n est ima ted at $ I.soo million,
inclusive of the Blue St«l, and the annual operatioll co~ts at SIZO million. The
British, in gmcral, hal'e had scvere problems in de\'eloping and maintaining the
capabilities for producing ad\'anced ain::rnft (27).
58. One estimate put the price of an early-production B·47 at $.1,4 million
pl us an almost com lmrable "alue of government-furnished elluillment (28) . T he
cost of one hour's flying is $500 (29). An examina tion of the United States B-47
programme relcals some idea of the rcsour(eS required to unde rtake such a programme. Employment at Roeing's \ Vichita, Kansas, plant was above 22,000, several
thousand in cx(ess of the force .... hkh turned out a recor d 100 B·29s a month
in the closing phase of the Second World War. Whm the go-ahead .... as given
on the B-47, employment was only 1,500 workers (30). 1\ 3-million-square-foot
plant, closed 011 \lar's end, was rcolenw and housed $29 million worth of machinery. Tn addi tion, large \Iartimc plants .... ere reactivated by Douglas and Lockhew for the produrtiOIl of B-47s with BOcing-furnished ellginccring' and tooling (31). The initial 11-47 tooling at Seattle alone cost $52.5 million with a simila r
COSt at Wichita.
Missilt.f

59. T he Minuteman t, which is deployed in ha rd ullderground launch sites
can be cOflsiclertd an example of a medium-len'l 5,000 n.mi.-r.lI1ge missile system.
\Vltile ac tual ~I in\lteman I procurement totalled o\er 800 missiles, the procurement costs for the "fint batch" of aJlproxim:llely fifty can be e<timatcd at $2 mil·
lion each (32). It shou ld be noted tha t the cost of basing a ~linlltem:11l is app roxima tcly $3 million. exclusive of the cost of the missile (33). For a for(e of fif ty
Minuteman I missi le~, the m i s~ile procurement costs including delelopmetl t would
be $1,100 million; the co~t s of b.'lsing in h:J.r(i etnplaCetnetlt about $150 million.
Adding annual operating rosts of $5 million (34), brings the total costs to
$1,300 million o\'er a ten-~t'ar period, or $130 million per year.
60, T he F rench SSBS missile system is similar to M. inuteman 1 in mally
respects, the major clilTercnce heing that the SSBS has a 2,000 n.mi. maximum
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rang~. It is expected that approximately twenty-five missiles" ill be deployed in
ha rdened unde rground emplacements. Since Ihe ssns programme is far from
completed, the pr ogrammed acquisition costs ;He liable to overrun, and ol>cratillg
costs must be considered. An estimate of the procurement costs is $700 million (35). The SSBS programme will co\·er a period of <llmost t('n years to
operational deployment, and was bnilt upon a h35ie research rocket capability (36) .
Industrial and resource reo:[uirement, especially tcst facilities, arc ('xltnsh'e (37).

6 1. The tot;!1 acquisition cost for a force of fourte~n Titan squadrons COlllprising 140 Titan I and Titan II missiles is ~stimated at $4,900 million. Resources
required for construction of fourteen squadrons is $796 million (38). As a
general rul~, for strategic ballistic missiles, 80 per cent of the total cost is taken
by ground-based facilities (39). The industri31 and resource effort requi red to
build one hardened la unch complex with nine missiles in underground silos involves th e usc of large-scale earth-moving equipment, specialized fuel-handling
equipment, etc., and is ronghly comparable to putting a ten-storey building underground (25). T he Titan missile production facility at Dem·er costs abou t
$52 million (40).
COSTS o~ A SOPIIIS TICATRtI t1fJ.IVERV S\'STEM

A ircraft

62. The only sophisticated bomber aircraft delivcry system presently under
devdopmcnt is the FB-llI, ill the Uni ted States. The estimated costs for the
acquisition of a force of 210 aircraft equippcd with SRAM air-to-surface missiles
are given as $2, 173 million (4 1). It should he noted that these estimates arc suhject to further overruns, aud that the FB- Ill is a derivative of the F-llI, thus a
major portion of its developmen t cost was charged off as part of the fighter
development programme (42). The operat ing costs of this iorce up to 1971 wil!
be $342 million (4 1) .

63. The United Kingdom cancclled an advanceo:\ supersonic bomber (TS R.2)
because of escalati ng and intolerable costs. It is rstima teo:l that 150 aircraft wou ld
have cost $2,000 million, at a un it rate of $14 million (43).
64. A modcl has been derived for computing monetary, manpo\\er and facility
requirements for supersonic combat aircraft of up to 100,000 pounds gross
weight (44). Cost data, calculated from these models, for a hypothetical aircraft
of 65,000 pounds maximum takc-oll weight would be;lS follows:

Design and development .............. . .. . .... . . . .
Engineer man-hou rs through prototype ........... .
Factory employmC"llt with a production rate of 12
units pcr month .. .. ..... . .. ............. . . ... . .
Factory fioor-space requirement with a production
............ .
rate of 12 units per month

$520 million
12 million man-hours
13,200
3,120,000 sq. ft.

Missi/n
65. An example of a small-size sophisticated missilc del ivery system is the
French MSBS system to consist of three missile-launching nuclear submarines,
each ar med wi th sixteen missiles of 1,500 n.mi. range. T hree submarines are
needed to assure that two of them arc on station at all times. The procurement
costs for this strategic nuclear force has been estimateo:l at $1,000 million (35),
and the estimate for the annual operati ng costs is $20 million. According to
reference ( 11 ) Ihe total French costs for missile-launching nuclear submarines
and the M SBS and SSBS system will through 1970 be $1.840 million, which is
slightly higher than the tota l of the ssns costs given in chapter 2.3.1.2 ($700 million) and the above procurement costs ($1,000 million). It should he noted tha t the
estimated costs gh·en below arc subjcrt to possible orerruns. In addition, the
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Msns and the ssns share many components, so that the development costs arc
not always easy to distinguish.
66. An example of a large force of sophisticated delive ry vehicles is the
United States l\avy's Polaris programme. The ultimate deployment of this force
will total forty-one submarines carrying sixteen missiles each. The missiles have
been developed and procured in three versions: A-I, A-2 and A-3. The first of
these has already been phased out. The P olaris A-2 \\i1l be replaced by the new
Poseidon missile itt the future, necessitating modifications to the submarines, as
\\ell as the de\·elopment and procurement of the missiles. The estimated costs of
the Polaris programmes, including the missiles, submarines and supporting facili·
ties, are expected to exceed $13,000 million by 1970 (45).
SU~fMAIIY Of O£LIVEIIY \'EHlQ.E COST DATA

67. A summary of procurement and Ol}('ration costs fo r the va r ious categories
of delivery \'ehicle systems is ghoen in table 9.
AN

EXAMPI.E OF ESCA lATI~C: COSTS AND COUNTt:ltlol[ASUIIES

United States deliver.\' v(lIide (osts b

68. The list of airc raft deployed and programmed in this category includes
the following: D-36, D-47, D-50, B-52, 8-58, Fll-IIl, KC-97 and KC-13i These
aircraft exceed 4,500 in number. Added to these are the Rascal, Hound Dog,
Quail and SRAIII, an missiles with procurements in the hundreds. In addition,
there were several aircraft de\'eloped either as prototypes, such as the XB·60 and
Xll.70, or produced in limited quantities, such as the 8-45. Several air-Io-surface
missiles (Skybolt and Goose) we re cancelled in development. An estimate of the
Rand D procurement. and base constnlction costs associated \';th the above, is on
the onler of $28.000 million. The estimated operating costs associated with the
deployed airc raft systems arc on the order of $31,500 million. These operating
costs do not include the anticipated operating costs of the FD·III force, nor the
cost of the logistic and defensive forces required for the support :l!Id protection
of the offensive forces. The strategic missile costs include the Rand 0 and
acquisition of missiles and the construction costs of the missile sites (soft and
hard) and the missile suhmarines and their supporting ships. Included among the
ballistic missile systems are: Thor, Jupiter, Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, Polaris and
Poseidon. In addition, there were several cruise mi5Siles de\eloped (some of these
were deployed for varying lengths of ti me). including Mace, Regulus, Snark and
Navaho. The estimated i!1\'estment costs associated with these systems arc
$37,000 million.
69. The operating costs associated with the missiles and their test acth·ities
are e$\im;lted to be $14,000 million.
70. The United States delivery vehicle costs can be Sl1!nmari7.ed as follo\\'s:
JUS milli,m,

Strategic aircra ft systems:
Acquisition cost ..
Operating cost, 1950-1970

28,000
31.500
SUBTOTAL

Strategic missile systems:
Acquisition cost ........... ...... ....... . . .
Operating oos t, 1960-1970

37,000
14,000
SUBTOTAL

b

59,500

51,000

United States Department of Defense 1967 Appropriation Hearings.
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TABLE

9.

SUM~IARY OF nrL IVE.RY V£IIICl.£ l'NOCUREM £NT ASD OPnATIOSS COSTS

(/n $US mil/iOM)
Syll(O"

P~"f~''"''U''1

S~.. lf '" duc.,I'''''~

f4f(tIDf?

("0 '"

Aircraft, elementary ........... 30-50 bombers (Canberra, B-57) ............................... .
~r'l
• ISS! e.

8l

50 missiles in sort emplacement, 500 n.mi. range . ............... .
I
50 missiles in soft cm])lacemenl, 1,500 n.mi. range .............. .
e ementary ........... { US Thor missile ....... ........ ............................... .
13 US Atlas squadrons (-1 40 missiles) ....................... .

A~ .. "oJ "trrol."I1
fOJU

ISO

25

440-540
800-900

10

600

5

4,900

Not available
2 per missile

940
1,800

100
120

50 ;\!inuteman I. in hard emplacement, 5,000 n.mi. range ........ .
medium-level., ...... . 2S F rench SSBS in hard emplacement, 2,000 n.mi. range ........ .
14 US Titan squadrons (-140 missiles) ....................... .

1,250
700
4,900

Not anilable
Not available

Aircraft, sophisticated ...• , .... 210 US FB-Ill with SRA:\! air-to-surface missiles ............ .

2,200

340
( Iotal to 1971)

1,000
13,000

20
Not a"ailable

A'
f
cd'
I I
JSO-6O French Mirage IV bombers .............................. .
Ircra I, m fUm- eve .... ·· .. l 300 British V-bombers (3 types) wilh air-to-surfaee missiles .... .
~fi ssil e.

j

........ J141~re:n~~
~~I~~~~lrl~~~:e ~1:~I~~.r 5~.~~~~'~~~ e~~~ '~'~:I~ .
us
3

Missile. sophisticated

..
...
..
16
Polaris-launching 5ubmarint"s. each with 16 missiles

5

mls-

71. Through the fiscal yC".1r 1965 the United States h;ul illlC'Sted l1('arl),
million (or the research and development. procurement. and related military
construction associated " ith the lleallOtlS currentl), in tlte .trategit retaliator),
(orccs. including:
$~3.000

, 1..\'

,."II~..,

10,100
3,]00
].500
2,800
1, ]00
;;.~oo

':;,iOO
7. 100

IO.JOO

{or 14 \Iings (6.10 UE alrcratl) of 8 ·52 heav) bombers
for 2 lOoings (fiO UI': aircraft) of 8 ·58 medium bomben
for 2 XB·70 tcst ai rcraft
(or the flee t o f 43 SQuadrons of KC· 1.15 t:w kers, u<ed (or aerial
refuell ing of the 8·52 and 13·58 fo rcts
for thc Quail deco)'s and the Hound Dog air·lo-surface missiles
used to Ol.id the 8·52·s penetrate to ta rgets
for IJ squadrons of Atlas liquid· fuelled miMi]~
for 12 5quadrons of Titan liquid·fuelled missiles
for ]6 !.Iinuteman I :md 4 :\Iinutcman II squadrom. rOlllpnsmg
1.000 missiles, funded th rough the fiscal year 1965. The Minute·
m:11l force to be achieved by 1969, including ret rofit, is csti·
mated to cost $11,100 million
for the fleft of ~ I Polaris submarines .md their SUI)llOrt ships
COllnltrmrosNrrs

72. Counterme;lsurc costs for missiles arc considered to he as~"ci" t etl "itlt til<':

oIf1,lo,llllcnt of au ." BM system ;lIId reactions to ABM deplo)'mellt~. In the Unitcd
~ta t cs, the ~ike · X system, consisting of both area :md point !Idellces, has been
U1l1ler dC\'elopmcnt for 5t\·er:l.1 years. Thc ilcqui~iliOfl costs of the Nike-X s)'Sltnl
w,1l !Iepend on Ihe extC1lt to \\hich it migh t be deployed. Estimated e(lSI~ range
(rom :lppro~imaiely $4,000 million for :l light d~ll loymelll :lgaiust a limited threat.
10 UI1\\anls of $40,000 million for a full deploymf"1lI against a soJlhi~lk:lted threat
CJ11 1110}ing a \'ariet), of (lCIlet rat ion :,ids. To be fuHy eliecti,.,::. an t\lUd sy~tcl1l
mu~t he sllpple1n('nlcd by a ci\'il defeuce prog ramlllc. pro\·iding bl1oll\ shelters.
T he cost of such a prngr;llnme is not included in the abo\'e fi<:ur('s. Penetration
Ol.id ~ ilre !Iesigned to increase Ihe dfccliI'ellCss of attacking forces aJ,!ainH tar~Cl~
\ldend l-d hy ABM~. The Unittd States has spent o\-er $1.200 mi\lion on n'se:,rrh
and del elopnKnt in this area. lJcployment of thtse dC\"kts "i!1 eutail additional
('Ost5.
PROCltIlJlMF.ST COSTS SliMMMlY

Mod.-st lIudraT (OfIJril)'
7J. As a ir.llne ot' rcierenc(', it h:l.5 been assumed that a eredihle but 1I100kst
nnclear capability could comprise a (1c1i1'erable warhead and an elementary dciivtry
s}"tcm. including intermediate·rallgc missiles and some ?ircraft. The assume,l
r( rce is made up .... f the following units:
T hir ty to fifty bombers of the Canberr:1 or 8 ·57 t)lle, ilur('hascu abroad;
Fifty medium'rauge missiles of the 1,500 n.mi.·rangt- in 50ft cmlllaccmcnts.
developed and produced indigenously;
One hundred nuclear wt-apons. dCI·e1oped. and produced indigcl10l1s1y.
74. AceonJing to the prt-violls tables 7 and 9. tht total minimum c"~t "f
llr'l', iring such a force deployed o\'er a ten·year period » ouM he $1.700 million.
"hith can be broken down a5 follows (in millions of US dollars):

200

\\'arheads (100)
Aircraft (30·50)
Missiles (50) ......... .. ............ .

'8<)
900

250

TOT;\!..

1,280

400

69

ISO

75. These rough tost es ti ma tes for a modest nuclea r force hal·e Ilcen h;ised
on the ~cielltirlc, tedmkal and industrial capabilities of 11 modern industrial nation,
which has already ;I. good experi t'nt'e in nuclear power, ;l.ircraft and space technology. The costs of sllth ;I. force I'o'ould obviously rUll higher if a ilomc,tic imll1Stri;ll b;l.se had to be estilblished for the developmen t ;md proouttioll of the delh·ery
system.

76. The above warhead costs a rc based on the S\ledish stu dy (·n, Idlkh
proba bly covers relatively crude testing of one sing le type of warhe;\{1. .·\n ex tension of the weapons programme to include production and testing of hoth
st ratcgit ami tattical lIeapons could, 115illg the French programme through
1960 ( II ) as an example, increase the tot al costs by some $50-60 million (sec also
sections on designing and mmmfacturing and on testing).
SIIIOI/, high-IIIIO/ily mulrar force

77. A Polish study has been undert;l.ken for the pu r pose of this report to
es ti ma te the cos ts of a small, high-qu;llity nuclear force (48). !\ pr01,;ram1lle
comprising hlO stages of five yea rs' duration h;l.s been envisaged. By the l'nd of
the first stage ( 1968- 1972) a nuclear fo rce of from tl'll to fifteen "ornbers :md
from fifteen to tllenty nuclear weapous \\Ollld be established, and during th c
second stage ( 1973-1977) th e force wouM be extemkd to includc from twcnty
to thi rty thermonuclear weapons, 100 interrnediate-r~ngc miss iles and tllO missileI~unching nuclear submarines. The tot;tl costs of this programme b;lsed on
domestic industry and home f!(;onomy resou rces Ilouid amount to $5,600 million,
resul t ing in average annua l tosts of $560 million.
78, The pictured Polish prog ramme ( 48) is a scaled-down version of the
Fr ench prog r amme (48). The cost es ti mate is considerably lower than the alll);lTel1l
('xpcnditures in France and the Uni tt'd Kingdom, both of IIhith arc in the eour$C
oi establishing high-qual it)' nuclear forces of moderate sizl'.

;9. F rcllch costs for the milita ry nuclear prog r amme to 1969 have I,eell estim31ed at $8,400 million ( 11 ), ;l.ud the United Kingdom cost to 1%9 al ;l sirnil:lr
amount."

ro. Annna l outlays uf $50 million lIere rcpresen tati IC of the early Frend.
programl1le, bu t these later rose to as much as $1,000 million for a single year.
8!. The actual annu31 costs of the nuclea r forces in some countries arc 5hOlln
in tal)le 10, Thl' costs arc also s iven relative to the annual defence bndgets :lIId
Gl\P.
82. CompariSOI1 of the figu res given in tabk 10 should be made "ith e;l1l\i .. n.
partly because the)' refe r to 1'0lmtrics at different stages of nuckar \le;111011~
d(,l·etopment, and partly bctause the size of the respceth·e nuclear forte~ is not
known.
AU.ocATtOS

OF

1I£5OI.:IlC£S

8.1. If the C:lpacity to produce a lluc1ear forte is to be deve loped indigenously,
and this is assumed to be the objective, the materials and manpower requirements
represent 110t only major financial outlays but, more significantly, ,·ery highly
specialized resou rces. Even for an industrialized country, the ecollomic diffitul ti es
are likely to be more for midable in these terms than in money terms (46).
84. The available publit literature on nuclear weapons development docs not
detail the resource reljuiremen ts for the ;,cquisilion and operaliou of a military• T he Un ited Kin gdom eo~t s arc not strictly comparable, sinte three bomber
types were del'eloped, procu red and deplo)cd O\·er a longer ptriod.
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TAB!.t.

10.

An !;AL COSTS or NUCLEAR FORCES

A"~,,,,' ~<>',. u
teTcr~,,,gr

Pa,od of

francc

......... .........

~tate •

T,,'«I (",,,

IUS

m,I/,,,",)

.l1,/oIar~

bu,/qrl

C/o,"!'

1960-1964
1965-1970

2.400
5,200

13
18

0.7
0.9

.... .

1%2-1963
1965-19{16
1966- 1967

.150
300

'SO

10
6

5

0.7
0.4
0.3

...........

1962
1963
1%4
1965
1966
1967

26.4
13.3
11.1
16.8
14.6
12.1

2.'
2.1
1.8
I.J
1.2
1.2

United Kingdom

L"nitl-U

e,"

I"",

C~~,,"y

<>f

13,100
12,100
11.200
8,lOCI
8,200
8,400

~i!-:1\ifi(a11t cOlpOlbility. Therc are, h,.",c\"l'r, numerous rderences suggcsting the
\arj(-ty, kind OInd QUOllit)' of resources needed.
8j. For a nuclear weapons programme, the b«sic ingredients arc raw matcrials, a corps of skilled engineers and e,.-\lCrt physid st~ allli a modern industrial
base (47). Sophisticated dcli\"ery systems are (.'(lual1y demanding of high-quality
ma terials :md skills.

86. A study of the numiJ.cr of scientific and tec!mical personnel required by
01 nation to build insta llations in which nnclcar wOIrheads could be prodllc~d on a
continuo us basis has estim;lted that approximately 1,300 engineers and 500 scierllists wou ld be needed.
87. For production of in termediate·range ballistic missiles. blimat~s suggest
that mall]lower requiremCllts for Il'chnicOlI and skill ed personnel \\O\lld run higher
than those for lIucle~ r weapollS. To produce and deploy fifty missiles of lhe intermcdiOlle-range size, il is estimated tll"t a peak labour force of 19,000 would be
need\!d, o\"er 5,000 of them scientists and engineers. Skill calegories \,ouid indude physicists, aerodynamics, mechanical ;mt! olhn engineer~ and large lIumiJ.crs
of skilled production workers, including machine oper,llors and welders.
88. Thc assumed bomber fl~c t would require at a minimum 1 or "1 million
()r mOTe engineering m;\n-houTS of skilled and unskilie,1 labour just 10 ilSsemb1c.
The design and de\"l'l\Jpmcllt stage would ~bsorb an ;lIl,lilional 1 millioll or more
engineering man-houn, which \,ould ill\"olve highly skilled eliorts ill aerodynamics, stress analysis, dc~ign work and fHght -teSli ng.
89. For Ihe devdopmen t of lhe Swedish AJ 37 Viggcn :,n ack-fighter lhe
IlCak manpower cflorts in J966 amounted to a total of 2,500, including 200 scientis ts. At a production rail' of, for e,.-ample. thir ty-three plOlnes per year about 4,000,
including 400 scientists and engineers, "ill be employed in the produclion.
90. F or lIlost countries becoming a nnclear power. the costs oi alloca tioll of
resources would be more significant than Ihe fin;!nda] costs, and eonsidl'r<lbly
mo re difficul t 10 delail and evaluate. Nei ther is a "bill of goods' available for the
assumed nuclear c<l pability; nor a rc adequa te dala a"aila blc 10 show nOll iollal
capabilities in the types of specialize(l, high·quality resources required by nuclea r
p r ogramme~.

91. The m:mpo,\('r Tt'tluiremcnts given above [or developing and manufacluril'g fifl) bombers and for designing, building alI(I deploying fifty missiles correspolld roughl)' to 7,000 ~ciClltisb, engineers and technicians. This nUll1ber of
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specialists "ould represent a large percentage of all
able in lIlan} countries.

s~ien ti sts

and ellgineers avail-

92. The establishment of the nudear force envisaged in t he Polish study
would require that almost the entire corps of sciultists, engineers and technical
personnel assigned to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as nearly all
nuclear-equipment-producing industries in Poland, would be absorbed by the
we"]lOns programme. Additionally, the most highly qualified fraction of all scientists, engineers ;lIld technicians ;wailable and a major fraction of, for in<tance.
the chemical. metallurgical and electronics industries would have to be alloca ted
to tJle weailons programme.
ECONOMU; 1~11'1.[C"T1UNS

93. T he derivation uf the data presented in the g raph in figure VIII of
section II of the report is explained beluw, and the actual \al ues plolted arc
given in table Il.'
94. The United Nations SIDtisti(DI Yearbook, 1965, table 192, presents fur
a large number of CQuntries reported expenditures by central and regional governments in several fields. For most countries, expenditures 011 defence, education
and health appea r as separate items. The amounts arc there quote\1 in national
curr enc), units. They have been converted to equh'alent Uni ted States dollars
using rates of exchange quoted in table ISS of the saUle Yearbook. \\'here rates
o f exchange 11;we varied, a selected mean figurc has been used. The year 1964
was selected as the latest for which most reports appellr. \Vhere the most recent
information was for another year, that is indicated in table I!. \Vhere there is
no report [or any item the country is omitted from that list. It may be observed
from the lists lhat the items are incomplete for two major cou11lries, France and
Italy, and this in the g raph in figure Vll! of the report causes some di~l'lace
ment to the lef t of the lines for health and education. The lack of information
from smaller countries has negligible effect.
95. In the grallh, horiwutal liues are drawn corresponding to the t\\'o illustrative expenditures of $170 million (US equi,alent) per year for a modest
nuclear force, and of $560 million per year for a small high-quality force. The
graph shows that these levels \\ould represent a "ery large comllOllent of the
total defence expenditure for all e:otcept llbout the lel1 largest, that is, six countries be)'ond the existing Iluclear-weapons Powers. About twenty countries have
higher total defellce expenditures than that for the modest nuclear armament of
$170 million per year.
96. It th us api'Cars that there arc only "bout six countries in the world, other
than the five nuc.lear-\\eapon Powers, that could contemplate an added expenditure of $1 70 million a year to del'elop a modest nuclear armament without
reallocating a major p;\rl of their tcchnical resources irom constructive activities.
F or the small nuclear capability sl1ggested costing $560 million a year, only the
six appear capable of finding the necessa ry resources.
97. \Vhat may be deri"ed correctly from the graph is an appreciation of thc
relative magnitude of the eX]lCnditure on a nuclear force compared with other
government expenditures on defence, education and health. Any further deductions from the grajlh should be made with caution, for it must be remembered
that accounts are not kept in the same way and rates of currency exchange vary.
~Iorcover, what 3re reported arc central and regional government expenditures,
and in many countries education and health arc to a eon,iderablc extent fin;mced
othenl'ise.
d T he form of presentation of the statistical data "as decided by the consultant expert group.
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li dw(Q " ~ "
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l' rQ~

",i/Jro'u

1%4
19M
1964
1964
1964
1964
1964
1964
1964
1964
1964
1964

5-1.514

USA

14,76~

U~SR

196'

496
443

1964
1964
(1963)

1964
1964
(l96J)

1964
1964
1964
1964
1964
, 19(2)
1964

:-.615
..1.016
3,891
1,702
1.568
1.467
924
774

73.
:'39
427
369

34<1
3'"
314

("",, ' y

UK
Germany. F.R.
France
India
Canada
hal y
PO\;l1ld
Swedl':n
Nethcrlnnds
Al1stralia
J3e1gium
Yugoslavia
Japan
Spain
Switzerland
Tur key
Brazil
Argentinn

302
,.7
UAR
2S0.5 Israel
241

"5
220
208

Pakistan
DenmnTk
Bulgaria
~on\ay

•

""al
,Y, .

",iI/'Q'"

2
J

USA

16.11))
-1,3-16

L·SSR
t:K
Germany. F.R.
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Poland
Belgium
India
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4
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1.003
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Brazil
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164
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140
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5
6
7
8
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Finland
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Denmark
Ilulgarii!.
Turke~

Allstrii!.
Spain
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~orway
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UAR

40,836
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3,231
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2-1S
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173
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( 1963)
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165
163
1J<;
128
107
73
64
60.'
53.8
SO.8
47.S
42
38.6
37.9
36
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USA
USSR
Germany, F.R.

UK
Australia
Poland
Canada
India
Denmark
Sweden
Vcnuuda
Brnzil
New Zei!.land
Argen tina
Bulgaria
Finland
Yugoslavia
Mexico
Turkey
Peru

UAR
South Africa
Belgium
Israel
Norwa.y
Nl':therla.nds
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(amli"Nrd)
U~/uct

..

~.,

''''
''''
'''''
1964
1964
1964

"

~

•

",,1/, ... ,

1964
1964
1964
1964

''''
''''

1964
1964
(1963)
1~F.r[R.:so::

193
188
176.3
165
160
144
132
130
130
94.1
78.5
78.2

"

l:·dM€~h" ..

l"d"H",

Iran
Gretee
Portugal
Indonesia
South Africa
Venezuela
Austria
~ I cxico

Finland
Thailand
Chile
Peru
)Jew Ze31:l11d

76

Phi li ppines

53.3

:\!ig~ri:,

•

Su,.l
N".

""/I,,,.. ,

Jl
32
33
34
J5
36
J7

38

New Zealand
Peru
Chile
107
Yugoslavia
105
Thailand
94.' Israd
Nigeria
89
7.5.1 South Africa
Pakistan
41.3 Portugal
41.1 Switzl'1"land

II.

29

30
(1963)

,.
14

•

""II,.,,,

C...... ,.,.

115
11 5

"

28

lI~al.~

lndom:s;a

J9

4.

41

t.:'liICd )Jations SI(l/iSli((l/ )'ra,.book, 196.'i, lables 191 aud 185.

( 196.1)

,"n .. ",,.,

35.7 Nigeria
Pakistan
Z6
21.2 Th:.i1and
14.1 Portuga l
11.1 Austria
6.• Imlonesia
3.7 S\\ itnrland
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